Most safely on the fence? A roundtable on the possibility of a “Canadian” foreign policy after 9/11

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Is a “Canadian” foreign policy relevant in the “hyperpower” era?
Robert Wolfe

Canadian foreign policy is the ultimate socially constructed concept. It is a set of ideas about what we collectively should do with the relations between the Canadian polity and other polities. Foreign policy is most evident in the statements and actions of government leaders, and in our diplomatic practice. But “Canadian foreign policy” is also an abstraction constructed in press commentary, dinner table conversations and scholarly research. This abstraction that is reproduced by teaching does not necessarily remain the same when translated from one official language to the other, and it does not necessarily stay the same when perceived reality changes. This roundtable is based on the assumption that external events that change our perceptions of the world might change how Canadians construct and reproduce their foreign policy.

The attacks of September 11, 2001 on New York and Washington, now remembered collectively as 9/11, are one such event that may have changed both the nature of world politics and how Canadians perceive their place in the world. Subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq only reinforced the sense that something of epochal significance had occurred. The organizers of the Canadian section of the International Studies Association wondered if the notion of something “Canadian” in foreign policy might no longer be relevant in a world reconfigured by the pre-eminence of the United States and its single-minded pursuit of its “war on terror”. We decided to have a roundtable on this question at the February 2003 meeting of the association in Portland, Oregon. This article reproduces the edited remarks that each participant presented at that time, with a second round of comments that each participant made in response to the other presentations and to subsequent questions posed by the moderator.

The simple facts of the Canadian response are easy to observe. Canada was immediately supportive of the war on terror. We have worked to improve airport security and we have collaborated on tightening the border with the United States. With many other countries we have helped to choke off sources of terrorist finance. And we have twice sent troops to Afghanistan. With respect to Iraq, in contrast, did Canadians no longer see themselves as being most safely in the middle (Holmes 1984)? The Government, making no pretence of power of any sort, tried to find a fence to sit on, neither saying that the UN would be the arbiter of Canadian actions, nor that this country would necessarily follow the USA into war without UN sanction. It is not clear whether the Government’s action was based on a sober assessment of what was best for Canada or the world, or on a calculus of electoral advantage in the pending provincial election in Québec. Should Prime Minister Chretien be described as advancing into the sea to lead in the advancing tide, as was once said of Mackenzie King?

The organizers posed the roundtable question in May 2002, when 9/11 and Afghanistan dominated the diplomatic landscape. The first round comments were presented in February 2003, as war with Iraq seemed inevitable whatever the world thought. The second round comments were prepared in May and June of 2003, after the supposed “end of major combat operations.” This introduction was prepared later in 2003 as the full extent of the Iraqi quagmire was becoming apparent, the Middle east road map to peace seemed to have led to a dead end, and the Americans were returning to the United Nations. The world has looked different at each of these moments, though in some ways it remains familiar. We see even more clearly that power is good.
for some things, like deterrence, but less good for compelling action (Baldwin, 1979), and not necessarily useful at all for the things that are most important for building enduring peace and prosperity. The USA is slowly discovering that even in the security domain, there are limits to what it can achieve on its own. It can break the Saddam Hussein regime, but it cannot easily create a replacement. As the USA rediscovers this painful reality, will it learn to listen again, even to Canadians?

The evidence from the economic domain is not heartening. Canadians were worried that American “disappointment” over Iraq, as expressed by Ambassador Paul Celluci, might have economic repercussions. Canada has not been doing well on selling either softwood lumber or beef in the U.S. market, but the reasons have to do not with the ability of senior officials and ministers to get a hearing in Washington, which is unimpaired (as we saw in the quick creation of a bilateral commission to investigate the great power blackout of August 2003), but with the inability of Canadians who don’t vote in Congressional elections to be heard above the din of powerful industry lobbyists. In the World Trade Organization, for another example, the launch of the Doha round in November 2001 owed only a little to a post-9/11 determination not to give the terrorists a victory, and there was no discernible impact of disagreements over Iraq in the fractious debates surrounding the Cancun ministerial in September 2003. But subsequent American pique with the small countries who were foolishly unprepared to do the hegemon’s bidding in Cancun raises questions about American commitment to multilateralism, which would have implications for how its partners, like Canada, conceive of managing of their relations.

The difficulty in thinking about a Canadian role in the era of the USA as a supposed hyperpower is trying to think of a Canadian policy that is not merely defined by the economic imperatives of ensuring that the border remains open or the nationalist imperatives of having a policy somehow differentiated from that of the Americans. How much room to maneuver is left? If Canadians had not wished to be so ambiguously on the fence, was there a position on Iraq that would serve how Canadians wish to act in the world, and that might have been influential?

The question for the participants in the roundtable is how we interpret and then teach about what we observe. Do we see a confident if ambiguous and puzzled Canadian reaction to events, or a world in which "Canada" is not a relevant abstraction? Or was Government policy shaped by a genuine division at home over the best course of action? Is Canada's role to do whatever our big neighbour wants, to uphold a naive multilateralism in opposition to Uncle Sam, or something else? Has the USA deviated from a norm to which it must soon revert, or has it redefined the basis for international order? Are we acting as we must, or as we wish, and does it matter, even to Canadians? In short, what is "Canadian" about our foreign policy today?

The roundtable approached the question through four optics. The first was empirical, with Andrew Cooper asking if diplomatic practice has changed. Heather Smith then asks if we have changed our teaching, and Claire Turenne Sjolander asks about the effect of 9/11 on theoretical work. Finally, given how media-centric these events have been, Louis Bélanger asks whether the same question can be asked in French, and finds that the answers differ. Cooper concludes that our policy is at best ambiguous. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that Smith and Sjolander find that teaching and research seem to have changed little. All of us conclude, however, that if we do now live in a unipolar world, one dominated by the USA as a rogue state,
as some American commentators have claimed (Bloom, 2002), then it will not be safe for politicians, scholars and teachers to stay on this fence.

**A Canadian response to a civilizational event? Diplomatic Ambiguity**  
Andrew F. Cooper

If 9/11 may be defined as a “civilizational” event (Huntington, 1996), what stands out about the character of the Canadian diplomatic response is its deep level of ambiguity. The post 9/11 World order -- unlike the post World War II system -- is not one in which the Canadian state and a number of selected Canadians held a privileged place as tailors in its creation. Nor is the emergent fabric of that order viewed with the same degree of pride in terms of its rules of the game or the blossoming of global institutions. Unlike the post Cold War order the introduction of the post 9/11 order was not accompanied by optimistic expectations about trends towards a flatter international hierarchy or the delivery of a peace dividend. Multilateralism has been subordinated to the primacy of the hyper-power. Empire and regime change through the use of force, mindsets more reminiscent of a much earlier era have come back in. Instead of democracy brought about in an incremental and sustained fashion from the ground up, long the favoured Canadian approach, the big bang approach is in ascendancy. Terrorists are seen not only without but within. The safety of states is placed above the benefits associated with human rights and even economic liberalism. Borders act as barriers not zones of confidence. Yet, if not a comfortable order, the pressure on Canada to accept the central tenets of this architecture has been intense. Whereas Canada retained some considerable space for innovation (through national welfare at home and diplomatic differentiation externally) in both the post 1945 and post Cold War orders (the classic account is Ruggie, 1983) the wriggle room in the post-9/11 world has become both narrow and risky.

Canadian awkwardness in this new environment is palpable, as seen in the Canadian discomfort when faced “coalitions of the willing” being redefined by polarization between those who are taken to be with the USA and those who are perceived to be against the USA. Canada through the 1990s became an active proponent of ad hoc assemblages (Cooper, 1999), as demonstrated by Canadian leadership on initiatives such as land mines and the International Criminal Court. The main distinguishing marks of these “coalitions of the willing” were their bottom up and mixed nature, with fluid albeit uneven partnerships between secondary states and non-state actors, their voluntary mode of association, and their emphasis on the reduction of coercive or force-oriented behaviour. The coalitions of the willing as harnessed by the administration of George W. Bush are very different. Instead of leadership by diffuse responsibility, America acts as the sheriff rounding up a posse of nations on an issue by issue basis. Instead of voluntarism, states are put in a position where they must choose between getting on board with the initiative or being labeled "not one of us." Instead of a cross-cutting membership, with abundant room and value placed on transnational societal networks and

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1 As an illustration of the transformation in U.S. thinking about coalitions of the willing, see the contrast between Richard N. Haass' writing at the end of the Cold War (Haass, 1997), and his thoughts as Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department post 9/11 in Defining U.S Foreign Policy in a Post-Post Cold War World," The 2002 Arthur Ross Lecture, Remarks to Foreign Policy Association, New York, NY, April 22, 2002.
linkages, participation in the U.S.-led coalitions of the willing is judged by the level of commitment offered and capabilities delivered within the state/military apparatus exclusively. An implicit threat of retaliation hovers over the exercise.

The challenge vis-à-vis the Canadian state in the way it defined and managed its response to this "with us" or "against us" dictum may be found not only in the tests related to offshore projection of power but on the test with respect to the nature of the "homeland." Canada was expected not only to be willing and able to go along in the ad hoc and muscular campaigns directed against al-Qaeda terrorism and the forced disarming of Saddam's Iraq. It also needed to signal a significant re-branding of the Canada-USA border away from the traditional image of the longest undefended border in the world. The incremental and technologically focussed attempt to deflect the implementation of a strategy based on a North American security perimeter reinforces the image of Canadian diplomatic ambiguity. Even a minister commonly perceived as being the most pro-American in the Chrétien government, John Manley, considered the calculus of embracing this security-oriented agenda to be unattractive, with the risks far out-weighing the benefits. As the "Security Czar " Manley worked hard to redefine the border not in terms of a bold European Union-style vision (with a hard outer shell and a porous inner layer) but as part of a gradual move towards a "smart" border.

Snapshots of the larger military cum diplomatic reaction after 9/11 confirm this impression of Canadian ambiguity. In the overseas fight against terrorism, Canadian participation in the coalition of the willing with respect to Afghanistan did not feature the followership practices highlighted in the Gulf War and the Kosovo intervention (On the concept of followership, see Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1991; for further applications, see Cooper and Nossal, 1997; Nossal and Roussel, 2000). Rather than contributions through naval and air forces, Canada's commitment to the first Afghanistan operation contained not just deployment of a number of Canadian ships but the participation under U.S. command of a 750 member “battle group" together with the deployment of personnel from the JTF 11. Although this shift deserves due attention, at the same time many caveats must be noted. Canada only joined up with the Americans in "Operation Harpoon" after it was excluded from a role with the international force led by the British forces in Kabul. And -due to over-stretch - the Canadian force was not only cobbled together from several sources but pulled out after a six-month period. A renewed commitment to the Afghanistan operation on the part of Canada is viewed as a compensatory move to offset an unwillingness to join “Operation Iraqi Freedom”—or even as an attempt to preclude such participation.

Institutionally, Canada's ambiguity stands out in a number of ways over a longer time frame. At odds with the U.S. insistence that terrorism be at the top of the agenda at the Kananaskis G-8 summit in 2002, Canada worked hard to put Africa generally and the New Plan for African Development (NEPAD) more specifically in the spotlight. This search for room and differentiation from the USA can also be seen in the push for the "Canadian compromise" proposal on Iraq at the UN in early 2003. Instead of simply going along with the USA (or for that matter completely distancing itself), Canadian state officials -- right up to the instigation of hostilities -- sought the possibility of the middle ground that might rally broadly-based multilateral support for the U.S. action.
In terms of a more precise causation, weight may be placed on varying interpretations concerning why Canada embraced ambiguity so pervasively. Through one lens, pride of place in any analysis must go to the role and mindset of Prime Minister Chrétien. From this perspective, Canadian diplomatic ambiguity is a reflection of Chrétien's well honed cautious instincts, reminiscent of former Prime Minister Mackenzie King's worries about how to join Britain in World War II. Any major change of course - never mind any innovative grand bargain - was a non-starter. The imprint of past tactical success combined with the imperatives of legacy politics to reinforce these instincts.

Through another lens, the trait of ambiguity has less to do with personality at the apex of politics and more to do with questions linked with identity and the nature and structure of Canadian society. One narrative of this type showcases the distinctive form of multiculturalism in Canada; with 9/11 reinforcing not the commonality but rather the divergences between Canada and the USA about citizenship generally and issues about racial profiling, dual nationality, the rights of landed immigrants, and the differences in reactions to "clash of civilizations" concept quite specifically. Another mixes a wider set of variables extending from an appreciation of the hold of older (albeit often inconsistent) habits rooted in Pearsonian UN-centred internationalism and Quebec exceptionalism with a recognition accorded to the increased salience of not only ethnic diversity but a substantial gender-gap and urban-rural distinctions. In both of these variants, values trump interests with Canada defined as a prototype civilian/rules-based (or Kantian) state, increasingly disconnected and uneasy with U.S. militarism and a gun culture domestically as well as its Hobbesian foreign policy.2

From a variety of other perspectives, of course, Canada's ambiguity is interpreted as a problem to be rectified not characteristics to be treasured. One strong underlying theme of this type despairs about Canada's fading profile in international affairs, with Canadian diplomacy treated as the equivalent of a Seinfeld plot—about nothingness. Whereas it once stood tall in the inner circle of global actors, Canada is castigated for having become marginalized to the point where it hardly exists on the global mental map. Through a backward-looking mind set, attention is focused on Canada's loss of memory and status due (unlike most notably, Australia) to its disengagement from a shared enterprise with the USA and Britain. Casting forward, intellectuals who have bought into the liberal Imperial project have urged Canada to address its waning influence by "matching...who we think we are and what we actually do."3 Still other critics have put their faith not in the rise of a new sense of idealism but in an instrumental reassertion of an interest-based approach to Canadian foreign policy as the full implications of the new post-post Cold War order kick in. Indeed some make the argument that even now Canada's ambiguity - or as some would have it nothingness - at the surface level belies the acceleration of integration


hidden from public view. Both in terms of military interoperability and economic harmonization the real effect of 9/11 is taken to have been an accentuation of trends already in train over a longer time frame.

Whether or not "everything has changed" post 9/11 the imperative to find useful intellectual frameworks or templates to better understand and come to terms with this event is essential. What in our traditional tool kit for the study of Canadian diplomacy should be jettisoned? Conversely, accepting that Canadian diplomacy still has relevance as a platform into crucial debates, what concepts need to be elevated in importance? While only one forum involving only a few voices in limited space, the conversation through this Roundtable provides a catalyst for this vital enterprise. I look forward to reading what the others have to say about our teaching and research.

**Have We Changed Our Teaching?**

Heather A. Smith

Teaching and learning must be about more than the recitation of a series of facts to be quickly forgotten once the exam is over. Teaching is a political act. It is political insofar as it involves power – between student and professor, professor and discipline, student and discipline and the discipline and the real world. Teaching defines potentially redefines our discipline. How and what we teach, how we learn and how we encourage our students to learn all contribute to the definition of what constitutes Canadian foreign policy. If teaching “facts” contributes to the training of a new citizenry, then our students must see themselves as empowered citizens who can make use of the “facts” we present. In sticking only with the “facts” of the field, we lose the whole world of foreign policy that exists in the lives of our students, but that is not included in the discipline’s core texts. This world reveals itself when we unsettle the mainstream and problematize foreign policy - when we ask questions concerning what we teach, and what is learned (Smith, Stienstra and Sjolander: 2003).

In January 2003, I emailed scholars across the country, at different ranks, and asked them to respond to the following set of questions: As a result of 9/11, have we changed our teaching? If you have changed your teaching can you describe how it has changed -- it is a change in course outline? Is it a change in the focus of the course? Is it a change in response to the students? Have the interests of the students changed? Did 9/11 make some issues more important to students then others? If your teaching didn't change, why not? Was 9/11 not relevant to the way you taught the course or the course content? Based on responses from across Canada, including my own responses as a teacher of introductory and upper division classes with significant foreign policy components, it appears that essentially there is more continuity then change in our teaching. While the finding of continuity may not be surprising to some, it does lend itself to some rather provocative questions about what constitutes Canadian foreign policy and the relationship between theory and practice in the form of teaching.

There was no radical change in what many of us teach. Our classes remain dominated by the “canon” of Keating (2002), Cooper (1997) and Nossal (1997) as the core texts, often with a *Canada Among Nations* volume and other articles, sometimes from critical theorists and
feminists (Neufeld 1995; Keeble and Smith 2000; Sjolander 2001) as supplementary to the texts. It seems that the “basics” of Canadian foreign policy remain the mainstay.

Why would this be the case? Several responses indicated that 9/11 did not represent anything new either as a terrorist act or in its effect on Canada-U.S. relations, and that therefore there was no need to redesign courses. For example, it was pointed out that the management of our relationship with the United States in conflict scenarios is not a new problem – recall Vietnam, Korea or the Gulf War. Another respondent stated they used 9/11 in class discussions of the Canada-U.S. relationship in the context of understanding the Canadian response vis-à-vis our dependence on the U.S. economy. This basic question about Canada’s freedom to maneuver in certain issue areas is also not new.

Many respondents felt that 9/11 was not a seminal event. It was suggested that 9/11 may well act as a marker in some way but it did not fundamentally alter the Canadian world. It may have intensified tensions or accelerated some of the integrative tendencies but the tensions existed before. As suggested in a recent volume of *Canada Among Nations*: “the challenges for Canadian foreign policy changed dramatically as a result of the 11 September raids, not in nature but in intensity” (Molot and Hillmer, 2002; 4). Thus, while Canadians may fret more over sovereignty, concerns about sovereignty have long been part of Canadian foreign policy.

Some changes were identified. Student enrolments are up. Many instructors added lectures on terrorism to their International Relations syllabi. Students wanted to talk about 9/11 and in many cases discussion periods, where they were part of the course, were often expanded. Many students felt a proximity to the event where typically they felt detached from international events. 9/11 made foreign policy and security issues more “real” for many students. As well, instructors used 9/11 as a hook by which to draw students into the analysis of events. But the use of a current events “hook” is not unusual as many of us seek to connect current events to the classroom and the experience is such that current events evolve and thus the “hook” evolves. One would expect that Iraq was a topic of many discussions inside and outside our classrooms in the spring of 2003. Some respondents also indicated that their students were tired of discussing 9/11 and wanted instructors to move onto other topics.

These findings are likely of no surprise to many or at least the many that responded to the questions posed. It is as if 9/11 was simply inserted into course outlines or lectures as an example that supported patterns routinely discussed in Canadian foreign policy. The ability to distance from the event and to objectively categorize 9/11 seems indicative of a traditional positivist response to the event. Frankly, the findings both surprise me and intrigue me. By asking whether or not our teaching has changed we reveal assumptions about what constitutes the discipline and assumptions about what it is appropriate to teach.

The questions about teaching are important because our colleagues, in responding to my questions, made reference to Canadian foreign policy classes but also to classes in Canadian-American relations, Canadian Politics, Introduction to Politics, Introduction to International Relations, and Canadian Public Policy. This shows that these questions do merit a broader discussion and we should not get stuck in disciplinary labels when we talk about Canadian foreign policy because it is clear that many instructors do not isolate the topic in foreign policy.
classes, and instructors of “Canadian” classes cross the domestic/international divide in their courses.

The frequency of the “nothing has really changed” argument, as noted above, is intriguing. The immutability of what constitutes the basics raises questions about both theory and practice. The “nothing has changed” argument suggests an inherent realism in our approaches to teaching – there are universals. And yet, are there fixed universals? Can we problematize our understanding of foreign policy in such a way to include typically silenced voices? What would happen if we challenged our assumptions of what constitutes foreign policy? What would happen, for example, if we took seriously Christine Sylvester’s (1996: 262) “everyday forms of feminist theorizing” which is understood to encompass “everyday forms of resistance and struggle [which] issue from activities of average people”. Would our perspective change if it included the voice of Arab-Canadians as they seek to travel into the USA to see family or go to conferences? Has their world changed? What about the families that lost loved ones in the Twin Towers? Or alternatively, what about a young runaway girl living and working on the mean streets of any one of Canada’s major (and even small) cities? Maybe her world has changed, maybe not. Canadian foreign policy is not typically about the lives of average people. It is about states and diplomats, room to maneuver and Canada’s position vis-à-vis the United States. These questions are indeed strange and odd, but they challenge us to ask for whom has nothing changed?

And, as noted earlier, the findings that nothing changed surprised me, on a very personal level. As an ‘academic’ perhaps I am expected to stand back and assess the event. As a person I can’t help but remember the early morning call on that fateful day, from my Ottawa-based sister, who demanded that I turn on the TV. There in all the glory of our media-linked world were the Twin Towers, falling to the ground. In silence we watched. As Chair of my program, I felt obliged to contact my faculty members, one of whom is American, to ensure that their families were ok. Students, faculty and staff watched TVs located around the campus in shock, while senior administration rushed to ensure that all faculty members abroad at that time were both accounted for and safe. Classes became debriefing sessions. At least in the moment, our lives changed. Many of us can continue to recall that day with great clarity. So how is it, that scholars across the country do not view 9/11 as a seminal event? How is it that for many teaching did not change? Part of the answer lies with the distance that many assume in their position as professor – it is not personal – it is professional. Thus we are obliged to discuss facts not feelings. It may also be a reflection of the discipline itself. We routinely talk about wars, death, and poverty from a distant vantage point. This perspective provides us with both objectivity and safety. We are kept safe from the harsh realities of that which we study. Maybe our teaching has not changed because it is easier for us personally. Indeed, this is yet another suggestion that will seem strange to many in the academy.

Finally, and from a less personal point of view, the questions that inform this commentary would benefit from a comparative analysis. What about Australia, the United States or the UK or say India? Has their teaching changed? Why? Why not? What does this say about the Canadian case? Expanding the analysis to other countries would provide for a means by which to measure whether or not the Canadian case is unique. Do we all teach “the basics” or is
the study and teaching of foreign policy in other countries somehow different? What is “Canadian” about the teaching of Canadian foreign policy?

Asking questions about teaching also matters because teaching is a political act. We rarely discuss teaching except perhaps over dinner at conferences or in the hallways of our universities with colleagues. We tend not to discuss teaching in our Canadian foreign policy panels because it is not “academic” (or maybe it has never been proposed?). But what we teach and how we teach represent our views of Canadian foreign policy and defines what is significant and what is not. The texts we adopt, the articles we include and how we structure our lectures represent Canadian foreign policy or Canada in the world, to our students. We as teachers function to reinforce or disrupt what is understood to be Canadian foreign policy.

Has our teaching changed? Not really. Does it matter? As long as teaching obscures the personal and functions to define and potentially redefine Canadian foreign policy, it does matter.

Has our theory changed?
Claire Turenne Sjolander

Has our theory changed in response to the events of 9/11? In order to answer this question, we need to ask ourselves about the theoretical specificity of the study of Canadian foreign policy. What do we study, and more generally, what is the purpose of theory in the study of Canada’s foreign policy? The answer to this second question foreshadows the answer to the more general one of whether our theory has changed? While it might seem as though our theories should change in light of major events, at least in so far as events may point to inconsistencies and discontinuities in the theoretical traditions we have at our disposal, theory’s main purpose is not to describe such events. Rather, theory provides us the tools to allow us to interpret events in a coherent manner, a need particularly felt given events of the magnitude of the Twin Tower and Pentagon attacks on 9/11.

From this perspective, it is unsurprising that the events of 9/11 have worked in large part to reinforce theoretical traditions in the study of Canadian foreign policy, as adherents of different approaches have found within them the tools to allow them to make coherent the implications for Canada of the events of 9/11. At the same time, however, 9/11 has suggested elements of contradiction pointing to theoretical discontinuity which may incite us to rethink some of our theoretical foundations.

Let us therefore start at the beginning. Bob Wolfe has asked us to reflect on what is “Canadian” about foreign policy since 9/11. One could easily also ask, what is particularly “Canadian” about the study of Canadian foreign policy? This is not to say that a recognizable subdiscipline labelled “Canadian foreign policy” does not exist, far from it. Canadian foreign policy may be the ultimate socially constructed concept, but it is also a constructed discipline, circumscribed by scholars engaged in a collective enterprise to distinguish a particular field of inquiry. It is, therefore, possible to identify key texts and literatures associated with the study of Canadian foreign policy – but the “Canadian” here refers to the object of study, and not to anything which is necessarily “Canadian” about the approach to that study. Perhaps better to
ask, then, what is the theoretical content of analyses of Canadian foreign policy? To answer this question, it is useful to begin at a point where many others have: Maureen Appel Molot’s 1990 typology of central approaches or themes in the study of Canadian foreign policy. The first of these approaches, Molot contends, is defined by a concern with Canada’s position in the international system. Here, we find two categories of answers: those who argue that Canada is a middle power (and in some instances, a principal or foremost power), and those who define Canada as a dependant state. These approaches are fundamentally concerned with interpreting Canadian foreign policy action through the mirror of its relationship with other (largely state) actors, often under the umbrella of multilateral fora and alliance relationships.

Since 9/11, this concern with place, location or role has hardly abated. The post-9/11 preoccupation with the management of the substantial economic and security relationship with the United States has lead some to the conclusion that the dependency model is most pertinent. The image of kilometres of transport trucks waiting at a closed Windsor-Detroit border crossing, the concrete realization of what it means for the Canadian economy that 86% of Canada’s exports are destined to the United States, the necessity of negotiating new modalities for border control (enshrined in the Smart Border 30-point Plan) – all pointed to the unalterable reality of continental integration, and of Canada’s dependence on the United States. For the first time in many years, concerns about the precariousness of Canada’s sovereignty were raised explicitly in public debate. No less an observer than Lloyd Axworthy (2002) sounded the alarm: in the post-9/11 age, Canada is sleepwalking into a closer relationship with the United States, one which will develop into “a sure recipe for subordination” of Canadian aspirations – at best. For adherents of the view of Canada as a middle power, on the other hand, Canada’s emphasis on multilateral processes throughout the war against terrorism (particularly in its manifestation in the war against Iraq) is seen as evidence of its middle power role. Indeed, the various attempts by Canadian officials to broker a Security Council compromise solution on a timetable for action against Iraq evoked images of an earlier era in Canadian foreign policy.

The second broad approach to Canadian foreign policy is one preoccupied by structures of decision-making, where the focus is on the cast of characters responsible for foreign policy formulation, including (but only to a limited extent) those who try to influence such decisions. Here too, the events of 9/11 have proven to be an analyst’s friend, and the game of “who is in and who is out” has provided much fruit for reflection. How does Bill Graham’s classic internationalism as Minister of Foreign Affairs marry with John Manley’s continentalist pragmatism as Deputy Prime Minister? What remains of former Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy’s multilateralist human security agenda? The tensions and contradictions which have long characterized the reflection on role and location in Canadian foreign policy are evident in these ministerial changes, and place the multilateral versus continental pulls and pushes in stark relief.

More critical analyses of Canadian foreign policy also have found interpretative fodder in the events of 9/11. What is critical to note here, as Nossal pointed out in his 2000 Journal of Canadian Studies article, is that most of this scholarship is “deeply skeptical of the Canadian national project” (96). Feminist, neo-gramscian, post-modern and post-colonial theorists writing on “Canadian” foreign policy problematize the idea of Canada and of foreign policy, as well as the distinctions between the inside and the outside that are privileged in these terms. To refer to
these approaches as being about Canadian foreign policy in any traditional sense is therefore somewhat problematic, and potentially misleading. If there seems to be little which is a priori “Canadian” in the study of Canadian foreign policy, these analyses put into question the very notion of an easily circumscribed “Canada”, making reflection on an easily defined “Canadian foreign policy” an even greater challenge. Nonetheless, in 9/11, critical scholars have found support for their insights on the gendered nature of a realist world order, on the importance of taking seriously the construction of identity and the we/they dichotomies that are often implied, or on the consequences of a growing crisis in hegemony – and of Canada’s role in the maintenance, construction, perpetuation or attenuation of world order.

Simply put, the point is that the events of 9/11 seemed to prove everyone right – or stated another way, 9/11 was a sufficiently complex event that it could be interpreted in a myriad of different ways (even in explicitly contradictory ways). 9/11, therefore, does not necessarily lay the foundations for theoretical change, but rather, seems to reinforce the existing plurality of approaches which characterize the study of Canadian foreign policy.

Does this mean that story ends here, however? There is, quite naturally, security in explaining shocking events through the invocation of theoretical lenses which are familiar. These approaches do potentially have something to tell us and to teach us. Where the events of 9/11 might eventually lead us in theoretical terms is another question, however. Even as a sense of territory and borders are reinforced in state practice by 9/11 (certainly this is the case on the North American continent), the events of 9/11 do push us to ask questions about what Robert Cox has called theory’s “habits of mind.” After 9/11, Cox writes,

it became commonplace to say that the whole world had changed. Of course, this sentiment was current mainly in North America and by extension in “the West”. The meaning was that habits of mind concerning the order of the world which had been formed by hitherto dominant power had been dramatically called into question. It was not so much that something totally new had suddenly come into existence as that a dramatic incident – the destruction of the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York and of part of the Pentagon in Washington – had brought into full consciousness changes which had been slowly taking place for some time, but which minds conditioned to a certain sense of order had comfortably obscured. (Cox 2002: xiii)

The theoretical challenge to which Robert Cox is pointing here is to be found in the juxtaposition of territorial and non-territorial confrontation. He goes on to point out, in reference to the way in which the responses to 9/11 have been defined:

...pursuit of this conflict through territorial power misunderstood its nature. Land may be occupied, people killed or imprisoned, but minds will not be changed by territorial military power. The use of force only confirms and exacerbates the conviction of its opponents that the dominant power is illegitimate. The dissidents cannot be crushed because they may be anywhere and everywhere. (2002: xiv)

These comments seem relevant not so much because they speak to the uneven emergence of a post-Westphalian world order, but because they point to the contradictions that emerge out
of fundamentally incompatible representations of the world and the legitimacy of the existing order. What is not clear is the extent to which the eventual theoretical responses to this challenge will have anything to say about “Canadian” foreign policy, or indeed, as our understanding about the nature of borders begins to evolve, anything to say about Canada.

Quebec and the World After 9/11: A “French” Turn?
Louis Bélanger

Does our question about the relevance of “Canadian” foreign policy have a different meaning in Quebec than in the rest of Canada? While it has been often said that Quebeckers have always had a distinct perspective on foreign policy issues, recent trends that I analyze below reveal a distinction no longer associated with nationalism but with a "French" perspective on global politics. This shift has been most noticeable for the past 18 months or so, thus we can link it to 9/11, even if, as I will argue, it is certainly connected to more domestic political evolutions. My intervention is divided in two parts. First, I want to describe this shift in the attitudes of Quebeckers in two areas: security and trade. Then, I will discuss three broad categories of possible explanation for it: the cultural explanation, the media/language explanation and the collective action explanation.

I begin with the shift in opinion, where we are observing a major shift in Quebec on foreign policy issues. This shift may have started before 9/11, but it seems that 9/11 has accelerated it. On trade as well as security issues this move can be summarized as an important move to the “left”. And in both areas, it seems that it is grounded in a common “framing” of international issues, distinct from the rest of Canada, in terms of a global conflict of values and the global North-South divide. Quebeckers seem to worry that to advance further the agenda of trade liberalization or to intervene in the Middle East will prompt negative reactions and create political instability.

Levels of mobilization and polls indicate that security is the issue where Quebeckers appear to be more radically different from Canadians as a whole or from English Canada. In Montreal in February 2003, 150 000 people marched in the street to demonstrate their opposition to war in Iraq, despite freezing cold temperatures of 20 below. It was the largest political rally in the history of Quebec, a history that is rich in public demonstrations. This total was more than double the total mobilization in English-speaking cities in Canada that same day.

The distinctiveness of Quebeckers’ attitude is also evident when one looks at polls. Last December, an Ekos poll asked Canadians if they would support or oppose Canadian participation in an attack on Iraq lead by the United States. Only 23% of Quebeckers would support such action, far behind even the most recalcitrant of the English-speaking provinces, British Columbia, where 34% of the population said they would support Canadian participation. The general level of support in Canada was 40%. According to the pollster, when asked if they can identify a cause for “conflicts and tensions between Western and Islamic World”, Quebeckers emphasized the existence of value conflicts between the two worlds (Ekos 2002).
The contrast between the views on Iraq of Quebeckers and other Canadians was even more dramatic after the war began. In another poll conducted by Ekos, Canadians were asked: “would you be in favor or against Canadian participation in an attack on Iraq if the USA and their allies had the full approval of the UNSC?” Results in Quebec were almost the exact opposite of the ones for Canada as a whole, with 61% against such intervention under the benediction of the UN and only 38% in favor. For Canada the results are 63% in favor and 35% against. According to the same survey, a majority of Quebeckers think that U.S. military power is threatening (52%) rather than reassuring (18%). While in Canada as a whole these proportions are respectively 34 and 31% (Ekos 2003).

I should add to these indicators a qualitative analysis of the arguments used in the francophone media to defend this pacifist trend. These arguments are another demonstration of how Quebeckers, and especially the intellectual elite in Quebec, see world politics through what I have called elsewhere (Bélanger 1997) a legalistic and idealistic lens, ignoring almost completely its realpolitik aspect. This is especially striking when you read the Open Ed signed by over 300 intellectuals published in Le Devoir (2003).

I think that this shift is also evident on economic issues. Quebeckers have always been more favorable toward free trade than English Canadians. This support is changing rapidly, and it seems that one of the reasons is that free-trade is no longer, in the mind of Quebeckers, associated closely with Canada-USA relations, but has taken a more diffuse and global signification.

Recent polls show that Quebeckers remain much more favourable than Anglo-Canadians to deeper political and economical integration with the United States. 42% vs. 27%, according to a CROP poll sponsored by L’Actualité and Maclean’s (Aubin 2002). But, at the same time, Quebeckers have become, among Canadians, the most timorous toward globalisation: 40% of all Quebeckers feel globalisation represents a threat, compared to 31% for Canadians. According to Léger Marketing, people in Quebec who are fearful of globalisation see things differently from the citizen from other provinces. Quebeckers fear domestic as well as global inequalities and their possible political impacts, while Canadians seem more preoccupied by U.S. domination and its consequences for the survival of a distinct Canadian identity (Léger Marketing, September 2002).

Turning now to explanations, one level of explanation for these differences is culture. As a political scientist, I am skeptical of any kind of culturalism. But if we want to give this level of explanation any weight, we have to say that it probably plays a more important role on security than on trade issues. According to pollster Jean-Marc Léger, Quebeckers’ reaction to the possibility of a war is better explained by Catholic roots than by French cultural roots: empathy with the underdog and mistrust of the powerful. So this could explain well why Quebeckers seem to resist realpolitik views and favor idealist ones.

Another level of explanation is the French connection. Because of the language barrier and connection, Quebeckers are less exposed to U.S. media and much more exposed to French coverage and opinions on international issues. It certainly has played an important role on the evolution of public opinion on Iraq. It also plays a role on trade issues since the anti-
globalization stand and anti-Americanism of many French newspapers and media are well-known. More broadly, this exposure to French discourse means an exposure to a very singular combination of left-wing and right-wing anti-globalization discourse associated with what is called in France “souverainisme” (not to be mistaken with Quebec “sovereignist” movement). On the left, a certain form of French anti-neoliberal anti-Americanism has received a very positive reception in the Quebec media and intellectual community.

Finally, one of the most evident factors explaining the state of public opinion as well as the level of mobilization witnessed is certainly the distinct structure of policy networking in Quebec. The peace rally in Montreal last February was organized by a loose coalition called “Collectif échec à la guerre” claiming to represent 120 different associations. This coalition is in fact built on a strong nucleus of organizations including labor unions, artist unions, writers unions, student movements, and other groups as well as political forces like the Bloc Québécois. This network mobilizes support around common causes like sovereignty, cultural diversity, language issues, poverty issues, and more recently, the reform of democratic institutions as well as opposition to a FTAA. So, generally speaking, we are talking about a left-wing, nationalist coalition.

It is interesting to note that during the NAFTA and CUSTA debates, this coalition was not efficiently activated against the trade deals for two basic reasons: the existence of a strong pro-American and pro-free trade current of thought inside the sovereignist movement, and disagreement between major trade unions on both free trade itself and strategy. My understanding is that the position of the labor unions on trade issues is more radical, particularly since the debate on the ill-fated Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). More profoundly, I wonder if this coalition has always established its legitimacy in Quebec on the basis of a discourse of survival that is constantly in need of new external threats. I would suggest that faced with a general willingness in the Quebec population to put aside for a while the constitutional or sovereignty issue, this coalition has found a new source of external threat at the international level. This threat has been easier to deploy because of the presence in France of a left-wing anti-globalization discourse that is “prêt-à-porter”.

**Round Two**

**Status Anxiety and Canadian foreign policy Post-Iraq**

Andrew F. Cooper

The post-post Cold War era has ushered in profound feelings of status anxiety about the place of Canada in the world. The majority of Canadians may agree with the Chretien government's decision not to be directly involved in the non-UN intervention on Iraq. Nonetheless, even among those supportive of this stay out option, concerns about the implications of this choice on the Canada-USA relationship shine through. Will Canada be shut out of familiar channels of access? Will linkage be applied between the security and economic domains?
In many ways, of course, the impression of Canada being completely off-side with the USA is misleading. In comparative terms Canada stayed below the radar simply because it was not a member of the Security Council. Unlike France and Russia inside the Permanent-5 or countries such as Germany or even Mexico and Chile outside, Canada's position did not carry immediate relevance. The U.S. Ambassador could express disappointment with the Canadian position - a gesture punctuated by President Bush's non-visit to Ottawa in May 2003 - but Canada remained down the queue as a target to be singled out for special or sustained punishment.

While Canada was not explicitly a member of the coalition of the willing on Iraq, paradoxically its contribution to the wider U.S.-led “War on Terrorism” has surpassed many inside this group. But when the Canadian position is challenged it is not Spain or Italy that these critics are thinking of. It is the robust endorsements of the war by the governments of Britain or Australia. Yet, if the positions of these two countries have certain attractions (whether because of an admiration for Tony Blair's oratorical skills and sense of conviction to the invitations to George W. Bush's ranch for Blair and John Howard) they also contain historical baggage and potential risks. Canada's future foreign policy should not revert to its far older tradition going back to the Boer War with its command of “ready aye ready.” If the Blair approach to Iraq has some commendable Gladstonian/ethical qualities attached to it, it also has the power projection associated with its imperial project attitudes long severed in the habits of Canadian foreign policy. Australia has been a country quite schizophrenic in its alternate pattern of a commitment to good “middle power” citizenship and followership to Britain and/or the USA. Moreover, unlike Australia, Canada had not tempered its multicultural tradition with the residue of a hard state willing and able to adopt a very different position on such issues as the interception and detention of refugees.

Consistent with its longstanding trajectory, Canada has signaled as well its intention of wanting to play a substantive role in the post-war reconstruction effort. As in the earlier Gulf War, this approach has an instrumental edge to it with the government and Canadian-based firms wanting to benefit from the distribution of contracts. Diplomatically, however, this process of engagement shows both the motivation and the confidence that Canada has in making a contribution on the ground: in niche areas ranging from the supply of basic goods and services, police work, and institution building.

Anxiety about the Canadian response to Iraq should not be based on what other countries did or did not do. The central question must be on how to reconcile - although not merge - the two fundamental and distinctive purposes of Canadian foreign policy. That is to say, the management of the “main game” of Canada-USA relations with the pursuit of a distinctive brand of multilateralism. Both sides of this dualistic framework contain interests as well as values. Both necessitate coalition-building and state-societal partnerships. Both contain elements of differentiated timelines, with a focus on immediate problem solving and over the horizon activities, with some degree of attention to rethinking what has worked (and what hasn't) in terms of governance fabric. And most crucially both need to be consistently if unevenly heeded and pursued if Canada is to get the balance - more positively defined and animated than merely a sense of calculated ambiguity - between them right in the post-Iraq and post-Chretien period.
The Disenchantment of Canadian foreign policy
Louis Bélanger

The exchange of views between the participants to this roundtable, and between them and the members of the Canadian foreign policy community who gathered in Portland, was fascinating. I entered in it quite convinced that 9/11 and its aftermath has not radically changed our approach to Canadian foreign policy. But our discussion as well as the unfolding of events during the two months during which we exchanged emails, had dinner, and crossed each other’s paths on different occasions, shook my view. I now believe that we are facing what can best be described as a disenchantment with Canadian diplomacy that could have profound consequences for the study of Canadian foreign policy. Thus, my reaction to what emerged from this conversation will be to explain what I mean by disenchantment and to suggest that all currents of Canadian foreign policy analysis should experience it positively.

Claire Turenne Sjolander is probably right when she says that 9/11 and its aftermath has not been considered as a threat to any IR theoretical tradition in Canada. (That she—and, I am sure, most of us—finds it “unsurprising” tells a lot though about the falsifiability of our theories…) Heather Smith’s survey supports this opinion. Still, the exasperation manifested by Andrew Cooper as well as Claire and Heather’s comments on the revealed precariousness of “Canada” as a foreign policy actor, show that, if the theories remain intact, the way in which they have normatively been linked to Canadian foreign policy as a political project may have been seriously altered. This is what I mean by disenchantment: the end of wonder as a driving force in the development of Canadian foreign policy studies.

Kim Nossal (2000) had convincingly showed in his Canadianization of IR article that Canadian foreign policy studies have been developed, in the seventies and the eighties, as a nationalist project. The developers of Canadian foreign policy have established it as a legitimate field of teaching and research in Canadian universities by claiming for Canada a significant role or location in the international system: be it the one of a “middle power”, of a “principal power”, or of a “foremost nation”. They have done so, in part, by taking their distance from theoretical approaches that would make it difficult to sustain their claim—mainly power-oriented realism—and adopting the ones which would give it support, like liberal institutionalism, theories of globalization, and constructivism. If Canada is to be a meaningful entity on the world stage despite its lack of crude power, then let’s find its meaning using theories which look away from the power factor to the benefit of ideas, skills, institutions or discourse. Thus, Canadian foreign policy scholars have created an idiosyncratic form of theoretical pluralism which, as Nossal points out, helped building a “Canadian” IR community distinct from the American, realist-dominated, IR community. While Nossal and many others see this evolution as a good thing, may I respectfully suggest that it also creates a dangerous alignment of national, political, disciplinary and theoretical affects and identities? This linkage between the development and legitimization of an academic object and its political equivalent is not uncommon (I am too familiar with Quebec scholars’ difficulties in problematizing the Quebec “nation” or “state” to think otherwise), but is nevertheless problematic. The risk being, obviously, to have academics driven collectively more by the seduction of the object of their inquiry, and by its reification in discourses of “middle-powermanship” or “human security”, than by scientific skepticism.
The events of 9/11 and, maybe more importantly, the reactions they triggered—border control, homeland security, the wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq—have plunged Canadian diplomacy into the state of ambiguity or “nothingness” vividly described by Andrew. Suddenly, the spell has broken. Not only have we witnessed a spectacular affirmation of power politics, but we have been struck by the irrelevance of Canadian soft power: no coalition of the like-minded countries, no public diplomacy campaign, no bridge-building action, no diplomatic creativity, no “human security” intervention seemed adequate as compensatory actions.

This may not challenge our respective theoretical, methodological, or pedagogical standpoints. But, it may positively reduce our collective level of enchantment. And it would be an excellent thing. We should certainly ask ourselves if the tools we used to analyze Canadian foreign policy were adequate, but we first should be interested by the coincidence of political and analytical confusion and ask why is it so that the ideal-types we until now used to analyze Canadian foreign policy were often similar to the ones DFAIT used to legitimize its policies. Before rushing into the business of reconstructing the relevance of Canada as an international actor and of Canadian foreign policy as a field of research, we should question our own role, as academics, in this business. Rather than abandon it, we should take this opportunity to rethink our relation to our object of study and try to dissociate political relevancy and academic relevancy.

The relevance of irrelevance
Claire Turenne Sjolander

The first round of comments underscored the extent to which the events of 9/11 did not establish a fundamentally new direction in Canadian foreign policy. 9/11 did not impose the necessity of unbridled patriotism and unquestioning loyalty to the federal government as it did in the United States. Canadian diplomatic response was ambiguous, reflecting discomfort with, as Andrew Cooper has put it, the “Hobbesian foreign policy” of the post-9/11 American state. The teaching of Canadian foreign policy did not change to reflect a perception that the world had been fundamentally altered, and theoretical debates continued much as they had prior to September 2001. From a Canadian perspective, one can be forgiven for asking whether 9/11 was irrelevant.

The facetious nature of this observation should not suggest that it is a trivial one. The chain of events set into motion by 9/11, culminating most recently in the undeclared coalition “victory” against the Iraqi regime, appears to have re-defined the global stage on which Canada aspires to remain a player. My earlier intervention asked if our eventual theoretical responses to these challenges would have anything to say about Canada. Cooper’s observations were blunter: Canadian diplomacy risked being treated as “the equivalent of a Seinfeld plot - about nothingness.” Taken as a whole, does 9/11, the war against terrorism, the campaign in Afghanistan, and the “liberation” of Iraq marginalise Canada to the status of an irrelevant abstraction? Put another way, is it a question of the irrelevance of 9/11 for much of what is Canada, or of the irrelevance of Canada for much of what seems to be the U.S. attempt to realign global politics along lines of its choosing since 9/11?
In the abstract, the relevance – or lack thereof – of Canada is not a particularly interesting question. As analysts, we must give the question its substance: irrelevance for whom? Clearly, Canadian irrelevance is central to the public message that President Bush sought to deliver when he invited the Australian Prime Minister to his Texas Crawford Ranch the same weekend he had been scheduled to meet with Prime Minister Chrétien in Ottawa. Canada was irrelevant to the war effort against Iraq, and may be consigned to near irrelevance in the post-war reconstruction, despite attempts to secure some role (and voice) in the process.

The near irrelevance of “Canada” has been felt in other ways. While the Chrétien government articulated its refusal to participate in the war effort, two provincial premiers were quick to point out the extent to which they supported the U.S. actions. While groups of Canadians participated in protests against the war in many communities across the country, rallies were also held in these same communities in support of the American intervention in Iraq. The attempt by provincial governments to position themselves on the continental stage in opposition to the federal decision raised questions as to the existence of an “authentic” Canadian voice speaking on the conflict. Is Canada irrelevant if it cannot speak with one voice, no matter whether anyone is listening to hear the dissent?

The decision of the Canadian state to refuse to participate in an action unsanctioned by the Security Council also speaks to another kind of irrelevance. At least in part, the Canadian response reflected a desire to protect the multilateral processes which had permitted – and to a large extent, defined – Canada’s place on the world stage from falling into the irrelevance which might stem from the exercise of U.S. hyper-power. Canada’s drift into the nothingness of a Seinfeld episode is facilitated by the questionably successful attempt of the Americans (and the British) to confer irrelevance upon the United Nations system. As the United Nations struggles to find its place in the post-9/11, post-Iraq world order, so too does Canada. This irrelevance touches many among the “coalition of the willing” as well – it would be difficult to find anyone but the most attentive analyst who could list all coalition partners. Relevance is not only about the “side” one has chosen in the war.

The larger question is not whether Canada is irrelevant in this new order, but whether this new order is itself sustainable. The territorial responses to the events of the 9/11 attacks underscore the extent to which territorial power continues to be a marker of the order the Bush administration seeks to promote. These territorial responses to the challenge of terrorism are not likely to resolve the deepening rifts over the legitimacy of that order – they will only exacerbate them. Canada’s relevance within such a territorial configuration defined by the exercise of hyper-power is obviously questionable – Canada certainly doesn’t have any hyper-power of its own, nor is it likely to be able, or interested, in playing on such a stage.

Is Canada relevant then? Perhaps not. But in the theoretical questioning of “Canada” which is to be found in some strands of critical reflection, there is undoubted relevance. It is in the very ambiguity of Canada – and in its potential irrelevance – that we find the antidote to the hyper-nationalism of territorial power. The ability to problematize Canada, and to question (without dismissing) the inherent reality or good of the sovereign state and the national project, is more likely to provide the opening which breaks down the “rhetorical cleavage between order and terrorism, between good and evil” (Cox 2002: xvii) which has been the result of 9/11 and of
the war in Iraq. Ambiguity, uncertainty, and indeed, irrelevance, facilitates the questioning of
the nature of perceived order, and serious questioning seems more appropriate to the challenges
confronting us since 9/11 than the ready answers found in the exercise of territorial hyper-power.

Maybe the Question is ‘Canadian’?
Heather A. Smith

The analyses that inform this debate were initially driven by questions about Canadian
foreign policy post 9/11. As the war with Iraq seems to be wrapping up our analyses may appear
to have been sideswiped by world events. The pivotal point for Canadian foreign policy, in
theory and practice, may not be 9/11, but the Prime Minister’s decision to not participate in the
U.S.-led war in Iraq.

And yet, the prescient insights of my colleagues speak to the fundamental questions
asked both eighteen months ago and yesterday. Louis Belanger highlights the disassociation of
Quebec and thus the federal nature of Canadian foreign policy. Claire Sjolander asks the
powerful question: “what is Canadian about Canadian foreign policy” and Andrew Cooper
eloquently outlines the ambiguity of Canada’s response post-9/11.

In turn, media reports tell us of Premiers writing letters to the American Ambassador to
Canada expressing grave concern over Canada’s position – quite in contrast to the position of
Quebec, but reinforcing the need to ponder federalism and foreign policy. The “principled”
decision of the PM is lambasted by some, praised by others, all while the PM seeks to be part of
the reconstruction process in Iraq. He has provided fodder for numerous theoretical
interpretations. Business representatives forecast gloom while thousands of Canadians take to the
streets – begging the question of who speaks for Canada and what is homogeneously “Canadian”
about the response to Iraq. The contributions here, coupled with world events, speak to the
intriguing complexity and continuity of fundamental questions of Canadian foreign policy in
theory and practice.

What we see here is a process that disrupts the “state” and simultaneously reinforces the
“state”. Similarly, recent events reinforce theoretical pluralism while also pointing to a need for
new ways to think about Canadian foreign policy.

States are constructed on foundations of power the exclude and marginalize – creating
bottom rungs and margins (Enloe 1996). If we open up the state, we see new and powerful sites
of foreign policy. Recent events, replete with actors from multiple sites, speak to the need for
Canadian foreign policy to be flexible enough to hear the multiple voices and to welcome the
disruption of the universals. Yet, the PM’s claims of sovereign decisions, the debates about
Canadian values versus interests, and what is the appropriate foreign policy path for Canada
reinforces and in some ways reclaims the Canadian territory. Whether or not we believe that the
PM made a principled decision he has claimed a “Canadian” way, that is distinct from the USA,
thus reasserting Canadian identity as opposed to a North American perspective, defined by the
Bush Administration.
The result of all of this is not, as recently claimed in the *Globe and Mail*, the disappearance of Canada internationally (Fagan; 2003), but perhaps a short-term redefinition of our relationship with the USA. Canadian Prime Ministers have opposed American behavior before and will likely do it again in the future. We have witnessed division inside Canada. The American Ambassador has chastised us. We are not, however, withering into irrelevance.

As scholars and teachers of Canadian foreign policy, we will undoubtedly continue to debate this issue. Some will interpret it through the lens of the role and status debate, some will look to alternative voices in their analysis. Some will condemn Prime Minister Chrétien even when he is long gone, and others will still cheer. Perhaps what is Canadian about all of this is precisely the debate about what is appropriate for “Canada” and the process that simultaneously reinforces and disrupts what constitutes Canada.

References


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