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Towards an *Explicative Understanding* of Strategic Culture: The Cases of Australia and Canada

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Why do states of ostensibly similar size, capability, characteristics, and location in the global economy respond differently to similar strategic stimuli? When confronted with a shifting pattern of power in the international system, why, for example, have two states that John C. Blaxland has called *strategic cousins*1 – Australia and Canada – pursued somewhat dissimilar strategic paths? One explanation may be found in the concept of strategic culture: the idea that each political community has a particular and individual approach to security policy.2 The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the utility of the concept of strategic culture for *understanding* patterns in the security policies of states, and to assess whether the concept may also have *explanatory* or predictive utility. We do so by examining the trends and discontinuities in the patterns of strategic behaviour of both Australia and Canada over the past century.

While there are similarities in the contemporary strategic behaviour of both Australia and Canada, there are also important differences that make a comparative study particularly useful for an assessment of strategic culture as an analytical tool. We argue that tracing the trends in strategic culture in Australia and Canada gives us an effective means of *understanding* the strategic policies pursued by each state, since a focus on strategic culture enables us to see the inertial impacts at work on the strategic behaviour of each country in the post-Cold War era. We are less convinced of the utility of strategic culture as an *explanation*, however. The ways in which strategic culture can be shaped by external factors – changes in the patterns of global politics, or unexpected shocks to the system – or domestic politics are sufficiently complex that the concept of strategic culture will be unlikely to allow us to make full-blown *predictive explanations* of the sort that positivists claim are possible. We conclude that the real utility of the concept of strategic culture is its ability to deepen our ‘explicative understanding’ of the patterns of security behaviour of states.

The Contested Nature of Strategic Culture

A decade after the initial debate between Alistair Iain Johnston and Colin Gray, strategic culture remains a deeply contested concept. Much of the contestation centres on the meaning and applicability of the concept and its epistemological implications for how we analyze state behaviour. Strategic studies has been traditionally dominated by theories that focus scholarly attention on measurable ‘causes’ of state behaviour such as technology, demography, economic development or geography. These tend to be grounded in the positivist epistemological tradition that separates cause and
effect: a state’s strategic behaviour, the dependent variable, is said to be caused by the interaction of independent variables such as those mentioned above. By contrast, the concept of ‘culture’ tends to be neglected by such scholars because, as Michael Desch argues, ‘cultural variables are tricky to define and operationalize’. ³

To be sure, there are some broadly ‘culturalist’ studies of strategy using concepts like norms, identity, and culture, such as those in the volume edited by Peter J. Katzenstein in 1996.⁴ But it is worth noting that in their introduction to the collection, Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein explicitly (and, Hopf adds, ‘somewhat defensively’)⁵ deny that the contributors use ‘any special interpretivist methodology’ or that they deviate from ‘normal science’.⁶ As Hopf notes, such ‘conventional constructivists’ do not regard the human world of institutions and social structures as ‘natural’ or ‘timeless’; instead, that world has been ‘constructed’, in large part the product of human agency. Nevertheless, to generate ‘useful’ knowledge they argue for a ‘minimal foundationalism, accepting that a contingent universalism is possible and may be necessary’.⁷

By contrast, those who most frequently use the concept of culture – sociologists and anthropologists – tend to focus on ideas, values, attitudes, and behaviour. Raymond Williams, for example, defines culture as ‘a description of a particular way of life which finds expression in institutions and behaviour’⁸ while Clifford Geertz suggests that it is ‘socially established structures of meaning in terms of which people … do things’.⁹ However, when positivists in international relations want to explain strategic behaviour, they treat it as a dependent variable that is analytically separated from the independent variables that cause it. In other words, because culture straddles the divide between independent and dependent variables, it is an inherently difficult concept for positivists to use.

Thus, for example, Johnston’s positivist definition of strategic culture sees it as ‘an integrated system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem unique, realistic and efficacious’.¹⁰ This definition, despite being inspired by the work of Geertz, does not include behaviour, and for good reason: strategic behaviour is what Johnston wants to use culture to explain. In essence, Johnston’s ‘argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors’ are all purely ideational variables that interact with material variables (like geography or technology) to cause strategic behaviour. (Indeed, Johnston could readily have replaced the concept of culture with identity, which by definition does not conflate ideas with behaviour.) Nevertheless, we find Johnston’s overtly positivist approach, which aims to produce ‘better … predictions about behaviour’,¹¹ to be inherently problematic. First, he is trying to use culture in a manner that is inconsistent with its ‘ordinary’ definition. Second, and more importantly, because the human world is so inherently complex it is simply not realistic to separate ideational factors from behaviour.

Gray, by contrast, argues that Johnston’s approach to strategic culture will lead scholars into an ‘intellectual wasteland’. Instead, Gray advocates a more interpretive
or contextual approach to strategic culture, one that conceives of it as 'both a shaping context for behaviour itself and as a constituent of that behaviour'.\textsuperscript{12} For Gray, strictly explaining behaviour as an effect of strategic culture ignores the fact that ‘strategic culture and patterns of strategic behaviour ... are related integrally’; that they are mutually constitutive; and, crucially, that a particular state’s strategic culture may evolve over time according to how it and others interpret its behaviour. In short, Gray defines strategic culture as a dynamic, mutually constitutive process of interchange between normative structures and agents: ‘socially transmitted ideas, attitudes and traditions, habits of mind and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has a necessarily unique historical experience’.\textsuperscript{13}

Our definition is even simpler: the habits of ideas, attitudes, and norms toward strategic issues, and patterns of strategic behaviour, which are relatively stable over time. Put another way, if norms and behaviour are both stable, this period of stability can be characterized as a particular strategic culture. In this respect, we agree with David Haglund, who has argued that the primary utility of the concept of strategic culture is that it helps define a research programme focused on ‘certain topics [that] would seem natural objects of our curiosity’ and that will provide a modicum of ‘explicative understanding’ of a state’s security policy.\textsuperscript{14}

This last point returns us to our discussion of what scholars investigating the human world of reflective beings can legitimately hope to achieve in an epistemological sense. As Hopf points out, critical scholars argue that trying to establish the sort of ‘minimum foundationalism’ to which conventional constructivists aspire is never really possible. Not only does the reflective nature of the human subject mean that any such finding is necessarily highly contingent, but the scholar in question becomes ‘part of the problem’ by naturalizing or normalizing what are in fact patterns of domination or exploitation.\textsuperscript{15}

While we agree that, strictly speaking, positivist and interpretivist approaches to generating knowledge are incommensurable, we find insistence upon this sharp distinction somewhat unrealistic. We certainly do not want to go as far as the contributors to the Katzenstein volume and claim for our analysis the predictive power of a positivist epistemology; after all, reflective human agents simply don’t ‘stand still’ for the purpose of positivist analysis. However, we do believe that the differences between understanding and explaining are overdrawn. Moreover, there is no reason why scholars using an interpretivist methodology should not legitimately strive to achieve at least a measure of explanation or even prediction. It is for this reason that we argue that we may, after we have attained a thorough understanding of a particular subject, move toward making explanatory and possibly even predictive findings. It is in this sense, then, that we use the phrase ‘explicative understanding’, as denoting something short of full-blown positivist prediction, yet more than simple description or criticism.

For these reasons, then, in this article we examine ideational factors (such as norms or identity), material factors (like geography and demography), and the strategic behaviour of Australia and Canada over time. More specifically, we acknowledge that strategic behaviour is caused by ideational and material factors.
But, following Guzzini,16 we suggest that that strategic behaviour creates a feedback loop that in turn ‘causes’ both ideational and material factors, or at least causes changes in the nature or meaning of those factors.

This last claim may seem, on the face of it, nonsensical: how can behaviour cause a material factor, or even cause a change in a material factor? At first blush, a material factor, such as a mountain range, might seem an immutable material factor. But while an actor’s behaviour certainly does not ‘cause’ a mountain range to rise, it does affect how the mountain range is interpreted, or put another way, what meaning is attached to it. A mountain range between states A and B will be given a different meaning if A feels threatened by B, because B has behaved aggressively toward other states, than if A wants to encourage trade with B after noticing that B usually behaves well toward its other trading partners. It is for this reason that Stuart Poore advises students of strategic culture to adopt a ‘context all the way down’ approach:

Strategists and their institutions cannot be acultural and hence will continuously perceive and interpret the material realm culturally...[Accordingly] strategic culture continually constitutes and gives meaning to material factors...[because] non-cultural or material variables can have no meaning outside of the cultures that condition them.17

Thus, for example, geography has had marked effects on the strategic cultures of Canada and Australia. The radically different geographical locations of the two countries can account for some of the differences between the patterns of strategic behaviour each state exhibits: Australia is a small Western state ‘all on its own’ in the South Pacific surrounded by larger Asian cultures that are conceived by many Australians to be alien, while Canada is perhaps the most secure state in the world given its proximity to (and good relations with) the global military hegemon, the US. Yet while we acknowledge the effect of these basic differences, we caution against geographical determinism; material facts about the world are given meaning through a process of interpretation, and the geographic differences between Australia and Canada are no exception.

Thus, despite the extremely secure conventional geostrategic position that Canadians have always enjoyed, there was a period when technology (particularly long-range bombers and ballistic missiles) changed the meaning of Canada’s geography by reducing its insulating effect. Similarly, the meaning given by Soviets to the fact that Canada was liberal-democratic, Anglo-Saxon, capitalist, and closely tied to the United States by economic, cultural, social, and military linkages, was such that Canadians became, if not synonymous with Americans, so close as to become a legitimate target for a Soviet nuclear attack, a fact not lost upon Canadian strategists who pushed for the creation of a continentalized North American Air Defense Command. Essentially, Canada and Australia faced the same type of strategic threat during the Cold War despite the enormous differences in geography. It is too simple, therefore, to look to geography alone to explain differences in strategic culture; it too needs to be considered contextually.

In short, a contextual exploration of the ideational factors, material factors, and the policy behaviour of these two countries will, we hope, demonstrate the utility...
of the concept of strategic culture to provide an ‘explicative understanding’ of why Australians and Canadians have made certain contemporary choices in security and defence policy, and the way in which that culture imposes limits on the defence choices of the governments in Canberra and Ottawa.  

**Australia’s Strategic Culture**

When the six colonies federated in 1901 as a self-governing ‘dominion’ in the British Empire, they inherited the *Realpolitik* traditions of British strategic culture, characterized by concerns to maintain hegemony on the high seas and a stable balance of power in Europe. We discern three major patterns of strategic behaviour, and three periods of reasonably distinct strategic culture.

**Pre-Federation to the Early 1970s**

Before federation Australian military units were involved in the Maori Wars in the 1840s and 1860s, the expedition to rescue General Charles ‘Chinese’ Gordon at Khartoum in 1885, and the Boer War and Boxer Rebellion at the turn of the century. Despite this record of raising expeditionary forces, domestic constituencies within the soon-to-federate colonies in the 1890s actually preferred continental defence by relatively small forces tasked with this modest aim, and this attitude would continue in the years after federation. The reason was twofold: a concern to keep the cost of defence at a minimum and a preference for asserting the independence of the new nation. Australia’s first prime minister, Sir Edmund Barton, believed, for example, that ‘to establish a special force, set aside for absolute control of the Imperial government, was objectionable’. Nevertheless, this initial preference for a continental defence strategy was overtaken rapidly by events such as the emergence of the Japanese as an aggressive power in the Pacific after it defeated Russia in 1905, and the subsequent withdrawal of substantial British naval assets from the Pacific to counter the growing German navy. Australia established a navy in 1911, the first dominion to do so. The navy’s task was to protect the sea lanes crucial to the continuance of imperial trade. In 1914, Australians became embroiled in British efforts to maintain the balance of power in Europe: Australians fought not only in the failed Gallipoli campaign, but also on the Western Front, suffering severe losses. We conclude, therefore, that from the beginning Australia’s strategic culture was essentially one of dependency (i.e., on Britain’s role as a great power) and forward defence, despite some ‘rumblings’ to the contrary.

Australian strategic culture did not change substantially after 1918. Indeed, the dominant security norm, which held that security was best achieved as an active participant in a powerful British Empire, was in fact reinforced, given that the Empire had ultimately prevailed. Other norms reinforced this central norm: Australia remained part of the imperial trade system, and the view that the ‘white man,’ particularly the Anglo-Saxon variant, was the natural leader in global affairs had also seemingly been reaffirmed. And Australia would continue to operate upon these premises; the norms that informed Australia’s strategic behaviour, we argue, remained substantially similar and the pattern of strategic behaviour itself demonstrated that
Australia’s strategic culture from the pre-federation era right up until the 1970s was characterized by dependence upon a ‘great and powerful friend’ and a willingness to use force to secure its interests in concert with its major ally. These trends were reaffirmed when in September 1939, following the government in London’s declaration of war on Germany, Australia’s prime minister and a significant proportion of its populace regarded this as meaning that Australia was, ipso facto, also at war.23

Australia’s active participation in the Second World War exposed the country to the first direct threat to its existence when, in early 1942, Japanese forces captured Singapore and landed on the northern coast of Papua New Guinea. Australia’s decision to concentrate in the Pacific theatre led to closer cooperation with the US, and the decision was vindicated when Australian troops pushed Japanese forces back along the Kokoda trail and the US fleet (with Royal Australian Navy support) intercepted and turned back a Japanese fleet in the Coral Sea in May 1942. The popular perception at the time (which still persists in many minds) is that Australia had categorically ‘swapped’ great and powerful friends.24 However, the ‘break’ with Britain was not immediate: Australian troops participated in colonial actions in Borneo and Malaya in the 1950s and early 1960s. Nevertheless, as the process of decolonization continued and Britain’s global power steadily declined the partnership with America became the central pillar of Australian strategic policy.

The strategic culture of dependency and willingness to use force overseas remained strong for decades after the Second World War, despite the (gradual) shift of reliance from Britain to America, and despite the fact that, for a short period, Australia’s post-war Labor Party (ALP) government flirted with ‘internationalism’. In particular, the Minister for External Affairs, Herbert ‘Doc’ Evans, a passionate believer in the perfectibility of humankind, saw an opportunity for the new United Nations to achieve what the League of Nations had failed to – lasting international peace built on universal principles of justice. But this potential new direction, which may have otherwise evolved into a strategic culture, was halted with the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, with the intensification of the Cold War in Europe, and the emergence of new threats, particularly from Indonesia under Sukarno.

This last factor was crucial; the initial reaction of the ALP had actually been to indirectly support the ‘plucky’ Indonesians in their attempts to throw off Dutch colonial rule. However, as Sukarno increasingly relied on nationalist fervour to sustain a policy of ‘konfrontasi’ with neighbouring states, including Australia, the more traditional strategic verities reasserted themselves.25 There was a large and influential communist party in Indonesia, which fed into the more general fear of communism gripping most Western states, and Australians continued intuitively to link their security to the global strength of great and powerful friends. Australia was willing to provide active support to these allies against communist enemies in Korea, Malaya, and Vietnam.

We argue, therefore, that Australia’s strategic culture did not change significantly as a result of the Second World War, despite the massive changes in the international system. American global power seemed the only bulwark to the southward march of communism, expressed most famously by the logic of the ‘domino theory’ (a logic
articulated by Australia’s Minister for External Affairs Percy Spender as early as 195026). Australia benefited from continued participation in the imperial trading system, and from the booming American-dominated post-war capitalist global trading system, enjoying a sustained period of economic prosperity.27 Australians also continued to see themselves as members of the ‘white race’ or culture that continued to dominate the world; these peripheral norms, we argue, served to reinforce the central norms that called for a reliable great-power alliance, strong armed forces and a willingness to use force overseas to secure Australia’s interests with little or no reference to the authority of international institutions. These various norms, and the consistent pattern of strategic behaviour that is observable across most of this period, constituted Australia’s strategic culture in the period between 1901 and 1970.

From the Early 1970s to the Late 1990s

In the early 1970s, however, Australia’s strategic culture did begin to change. The norms that informed strategic behaviour and the pattern of its strategic behaviour both began to shift. The reasons are complex and intertwined, but we discern three major triggers. First, America, shaken by the trauma of Vietnam, enunciated the Guam Doctrine in 1969, which couched American strategic commitments in Asia in significantly more ambiguous terms.28 Combined with Britain’s strategic retreat from Asia and the attainment of strategic parity by the Soviets, Australia’s great and powerful friends seemed to be less and less willing (and able) to guarantee Australia’s security. Second, Australia’s prosperity seemed no longer to be tied inextricably to the fortunes of one or the other of its great and powerful friends as Britain joined the European Economic Community and the US seemed to decline economically,29 forcing Australia to look elsewhere (particularly toward Asia) for economic opportunities. These two factors are, of course, primarily a result of changes to the Australia’s external environment, but the third is a complex mixture of external and domestic factors. We claim that the feeling of innate superiority, institutionally entrenched in the discriminatory White Australia Policy, began to lose its grip; the process of decolonization (not least the military defeats of Western powers in Indonesia, Vietnam, and Algeria), as well as the increasing prosperity of many Asian economies, prompted serious reconsideration of Australia’s role in global affairs.30 Arguably, too, ideas from the civil rights movement in the US filtered into Australian political discourse and led to increasingly strident calls for justice by Aboriginal Australians who, until the late 1960s, had not even been granted citizenship. The significant influx of non-English-speaking immigrants in the post-war decades, too, also probably contributed to the general dissatisfaction with Australia’s traditionally Anglo-Saxon identity.

Adopting Gray’s approach, we conclude that Australia’s traditional pattern of strategic behaviour, its strategic culture of forward defence in support of a ‘guarantor’ of security, was becoming less appropriate to the contextual circumstances it found itself in. Put another way, the pattern of strategic behaviour that constituted Australia’s traditional strategic culture was interpreted as being unsuitable. Accordingly, policy-makers were forced to begin soul-searching and reinterpreting
the norms that had hitherto underpinned the traditional strategic culture; specifically, a conscious effort was made to redefine Australia’s identity that had inescapable implications for its strategic culture, the most obvious manifestation of which was in the economic and cultural spheres, and here much of the early impetus was provided by the reformist ALP government of Gough Whitlam. For our purposes, however, the changes in the security sphere are of considerable importance because, as the 1976 White Paper noted, in response to the Guam Doctrine,

It must be unequivocally realised that an alliance [i.e., ANZUS] does not free a nation from the responsibility to make adequate provision for its own security... independent of any allies, should circumstances demand such.

It took another eleven years for the ‘continental,’ or self-reliant, defence doctrine to be officially enshrined in the 1987 White Paper, but by this time the Australian Defence Force (ADF) had already been substantially restructured to reflect the new priorities. There was a relative decline in size of the army at the same time that heavy investment in naval and air assets took place in recognition of the fact that these services would be the most crucial to the self-sufficient defence of the Australian continent. The abandonment of ‘forward’ for continental defence marked a fundamental change in the way Australia viewed the efficacy of force in its foreign policy, the propriety of intervention, and its relationship with its great-power ally.

In particular, Australia increasingly shied away from interventionist operations in coalition with the US. Instead, it adopted a more internationalist strategic stance, viewing the international system as a sort of ‘society’ within which Australia should play the part of the ‘good international citizen’. Between 1970 and 2003, Australian troops were deployed only sparingly overseas, and such operations were, notably, always UN-authorized; they included the first Gulf War in 1991, the nation-building effort in Cambodia (UNTAC), and the peace-enforcement mission to East Timor in 1999. The mission in Cambodia in particular was the brainchild of Australia’s most ‘internationalist’ foreign minister, Gareth Evans, and reflected his views of the manner in which Australia should use force; in pursuit of humanitarian goals under the auspices of international institutions. As late as the turn of the millennium, therefore, Australia’s strategic culture seemed to have evolved substantially; it was now marked by careful respect for the sovereignty of its neighbours, self-reliant continental defence, and a preference for the use of force in interventionist operations to proceed only under UN auspices. The end of the Cold War served only to reinforce the appropriateness of this less belligerent, more independent and principled strategic culture, given that the existential threat of the Soviet Union, whose naval forays into the Pacific and Indian oceans in the late 1970s and early 1980s had troubled some of the more traditional strategists and politicians, disappeared completely. We find, therefore, that the persistence of the norms that informed Australia’s strategic behaviour during the period from the early 1970s until the end of the 1990s, and the pattern of strategic behaviour itself, demonstrate enough stability to be considered a strategic culture that differed in important respects from that which had preceded it.
But after 2000, the Liberal/National Coalition government of John Howard powerfully reinvigorated the US alliance and began adopting a far more interventionist stance, coupled with a thinly veiled disdain for the ‘relevance’ of the UN that implied it felt force was once again an appropriate foreign policy tool. How are we to explain this ‘strategic U-turn’? We argue that the answer lies in the enduring, latent strength of Australia’s traditional or ‘default’ strategic culture. In particular, the traditional themes and norms of Australia’s strategic culture had not been completely excised; they still remained in the ‘realm of the possible’ and were part of ‘the discourse’. When decision-makers were faced with the challenge of changing objective circumstances, therefore, the old strategic traditions were, in a sense, ‘ready made’, easily understandable, and culturally palatable.

The Late 1990s and Beyond

Australia’s strategic U-turn occurred against a contextual backdrop of both domestic and external ‘environmental’ factors. Deep schisms about Australia’s proper ‘role’ in the world emerged in the 1990s; efforts to reconceptualize Australia’s identity as an ‘Asian nation’ had always been an elite-driven project that held most weight in the ALP and in some media and academic circles.36 The momentum of this movement began to wane after the 1996 election that brought Howard and the Coalition to office in the midst of a very effective campaign spearheaded by a backbench MP from Queensland, Pauline Hanson, who openly questioned multiculturalism and immigration from Asia. As the US economy enjoyed sustained growth throughout the 1990s, while the Asian economic crisis and the decade-long malaise of the Japanese economy tarnished the image of endless growth by the ‘Asian Tigers’, once again the old idea that Australia’s prosperity was intricately linked to its relationship with a great and powerful friend seemed to gain new relevance, manifested in the push to secure an Australian–American Trade Agreement.

More importantly, the move toward strategic self-reliance had arguably always been somewhat half-hearted. The ALP government of Bob Hawke had worked tirelessly to ensure that ANZUS was salvaged as an exclusively Australian–US alliance after New Zealand was in effect expelled in 1984 over the issue of nuclear ships. Likewise, Hawke committed troops to the American-led coalition to oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait before UN authorization was formally secured. The Australian and American militaries continued to maintain a close relationship, especially on procurement policy and ‘interoperability’ of the ADF with American forces.37 In other words, despite some changes to the strategic behaviour of Australia in this period, changes that we have characterized above as a distinctively different strategic culture from that which preceded it, we also note that aspects of the traditional strategic culture continued to linger.

These observations all demonstrate that Australia’s traditional strategic culture of dependency and willingness to use force to secure its interests without UN approval is essentially a ‘default’ position. While seemingly overshadowed by the efforts to forge an independent, self-reliant, ‘good international citizen’ self-image, the traditional strategic culture was in fact never far from the surface. It was, therefore, poised to
rise phoenix-like from the ashes of a serious international crisis, given the right circumstances.

What, then, constituted ‘the right circumstances’? We argue that a series of ‘strategic shocks’, interacting with the ‘background’ factors discussed above, precipitated the strategic shift. The Asian economic crisis caused the downfall of President Suharto in Indonesia, precipitating chaos in East Timor; Australia intervened with UN authorization and logistical support from the United States, plunging relations with Indonesia into crisis. In the midst of this antagonistic bilateral climate came 9/11, provoking a vigorous and aggressive US response. Australia committed troops to the invasion of Afghanistan, further outraging Indonesian Islamic fundamentalists, who targeted Australians in Bali, killing 88 in October 2002. ADF units were nevertheless committed to the American-led coalition that invaded Iraq in March 2003. Subsequently, Islamic terrorists bombed the Australian embassy in Jakarta, tried (but failed) to do the same in Singapore, and bombed Bali again. Jemaah Islamiyah even drafted an ambitious ‘Grand Strategy’ to create an Islamic super-state that would include Australia’s mineral-rich north.38

In short, we argue that the pre-9/11 antagonistic relationship between Australia and Indonesia, coupled with the events of that fateful day and its aftermath (particularly the Bali bombing), once again forced Australia to fundamentally review its strategic behaviour, with the result that many of the norms that had underpinned the internationalist strategic culture and continental defence doctrine were interpreted as being unsuitable to the new, more threatening strategic environment that Australia faced. The Howard government consequently turned to the still surviving default strategic culture, rehabilitating the ready-made ‘perceptual lens’ to the point where it again dominates Australia’s strategic thinking.

The pattern of Australia’s strategic behaviour since 2001 suggests that it has been far more willing to use force and engage in interventions that have either no, or minimal, UN-backing. Australian troops intervened in Solomon Islands in 2003, and again in early 2006 as part of Operation Helpem Fren. New efforts (including a significant Australian police presence) have been made to restore domestic order in Papua New Guinea; a ‘stabilization force’ was recommitted to East Timor in May 2006 without formal UN authorization; and Australian troops were deployed to Tonga in late 2006 when riots broke out in its central business district.39 There was no UN authorization for the Iraq invasion; this operation was taken in conjunction with American forces, while those in Australia’s immediate region were all characterized by strong American diplomatic and logistical backing.40 Normatively, the discourse has become less optimistic about the possibility of securing international order through institutions; the language of fear dominates much of Australia’s strategic discourse again, whether fear of Islamic terrorism, ‘illegal’ refugees or even the challenge posed by a rising China.41 Australia suddenly (and unexpectedly) has returned to a foreign policy stance that regards the use of force, with or without UN authorization, as once again a tool of considerable utility in international relations, and a solid alliance with a great power of vital importance.

To this point, the discussion has focused on understanding Australian strategic culture in the manner that Gray advocates, as an evolving process of change as
actors respond in a mutually constitutive manner to changes in the external environment in which they operate. But can strategic culture also be used in the manner that Johnston advocates, as an analytical tool that explains or even helps predict future strategic behaviour? We believe that it can in Australia’s case, although we caution against expecting too much, in line with our epistemological warnings earlier in this piece. Nevertheless, the current strategic culture seems to be quite stable and enduring, particularly because it is informed by a long tradition that finds wide support in the nation’s symbols and rituals (particularly the remarkably enduring ANZAC myth). Accordingly, we believe it may be possible to engage in a measure of explicative understanding and even make the tentative prediction that Australia’s response to future strategic challenges is likely to remain broadly similar for some time.

For example, by 2007 Australian troops were stationed in both Afghanistan and Iraq to support ongoing nation-building efforts; significantly, the battalion assigned to protect Japanese troops in the south of Iraq remained there even after the Japanese were withdrawn. Australia participated in both the National Missile Defense and Joint Strike Fighter programmes. It consistently supported US diplomacy across a broad range of international issues, refusing to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, backing US anti-proliferation initiatives, and tacitly colluding with American policy toward detainees held at Guantanamo Bay. Perhaps most intriguingly, in 2007 Australia signed a ‘security agreement’ with Japan, making Australia the only state other than the US with which Japan has any formal strategic ties. This is expected to create a trilateral US–Japan–Australia strategic relationship, tying Australia even more closely to American strategic designs in the region and which, despite protestations to the contrary, seems motivated in part by concerns over the rise of China as a major strategic force.

We discern further evidence from the strength of the norms that currently inform Australian strategic behaviour. Alexander Downer, the foreign minister, has publically lauded the neo-conservative agenda, explicitly stating ‘we are committed to the same goals’. Evidence suggests that Australian and American policymakers secretly discussed, and possibly even approached members of the Fijian military, to ‘encourage’ a coup in the midst of the island state’s recent constitutional crisis; we take this as evidence that, normatively, Australian policymakers are prepared to consider active, direct intervention in the internal affairs of other sovereign states. Finally, the ALP’s leadership in the mid-2000s – Kim Beazley, who became leader in January 2005, and Kevin Rudd, who succeeded him in December 2006 – strongly supported retaining the US alliance as the central pillar of Australia’s strategic policy; ALP anti-Americanism was seemingly quashed after the downfall of Mark Latham, former leader and strong US-critic. Likewise, when Howard’s open criticism of the call by US presidential candidate Barack Obama for a deadline for withdrawal from Iraq prompted a terse, dismissive reply from Obama, Rudd was able to position himself as a more ‘responsible’ choice for prime minister. Australian public opinion is also supportive: before the 2004 election 84 per cent of those polled agreed that the American alliance was important to ensuring Australia’s security.
Some might argue that party politics better explains the shifts in Australian strategic behaviour over time. It is true that the ALP has tended to favour the internationalist strategic culture that we have identified: Barton headed the Protectionist Party and held office in coalition with Labor; Evatt was a member of the Chifley Labor government; and the two most prominent drivers of the internationalist phase, Whitlam and Evans, were both prominent ALP politicians. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that ALP leaders (other than Latham) have strongly supported the alliance: Hawke worked tirelessly to retain ANZUS and, of course, it was John Curtin, prime minister during the Second World War, who forged the alliance in the first place. At the same time, it should be noted that ‘internationalist’ views were also held by such Liberal political leaders, such as Malcolm Fraser, prime minister between 1975 and 1983, most obviously demonstrated by his crusade against apartheid in South Africa. In short, party politics tells us that the internationalist tradition is somewhat stronger in the ALP than it is within Liberal circles, but little more.

Accordingly, we argue that Australia’s strategic culture has powerfully and unambiguously reverted to one characterized by dependency on its great and powerful friend, and a predisposition to use force to protect or further its interests, making some measure of predictions about the future course of strategic behaviour possible. In short, Australia will, we believe, continue to view the strategic challenges it faces through the ‘lens’ of its traditional strategic culture, and will accordingly not shy away from using force, particularly in coalition with, or with the backing of, its great and powerful friend.

Strategic Culture in Canada

As in Australia, Canadian strategic culture also evolved out of dependence on the British Empire for security, and, as in Australia, shifted with the broad shifts in global politics over the 20th century – though, as we will see, not always in sync with Australia.

The Imperial Period, 1867–1919

Like Australians, Canadians were constrained to conceive of their security within the context of the Empire, although it manifested itself in different ways. Canadians sought self-governing Dominion status in the midst of the US Civil War; the creation of a Canadian federation in 1867 within the British Empire was designed, in part, to protect those in the northern half of North America against expansionist sentiment in the US fuelled by the ideal of Manifest Destiny. But unlike Australians, Canadians never had to actively seek a ‘great and powerful’ friend to defend them against the possible American predations; instead, they relied on ties of interest between London and Washington to ensure the continued existence of a separate state in North America.

Canadian strategic culture also focused on the security of something broader than just Canada – the British Empire. H. Blair Neatby reminds us that most English-speaking Canadians were ‘bound to the old country by less clearly formulated
sentiments [of] a natural affection for their Motherland'. It was this ‘natural affection’ that would lead English-speaking Canadians to press an uneasy French-speaking Canadian prime minister, Wilfrid Laurier, to participate in the Boer War in 1899, a war that was deeply unpopular among French-speaking Canadians. Likewise, this strategic culture of imperial connection, characterized by a willingness to support British strategic initiatives with force, led English-speaking Canadians to volunteer in great numbers to fight in the Great War. Indeed, when the prime minister, Sir Robert Borden, asserted that ‘the “national” interests of Canada and the “imperial” interests of Canada during the Great War were demonstrably the same’, he would have been speaking for many English-speaking Canadians.

French-speaking Canadians did not, however, automatically identify with the Empire. Both the Boer War and the First World War demonstrated the deep and enduring contradictions in Canadian strategic culture that sprang from the basic incompatibility between the imperialist sentiments of English Canadians and the dualistic nature of the Canadian polity. As Henri Bourassa put it in 1917: ‘Canadians of British origin have become quite unsettled as to their allegiance... The French-Canadians have remained, and want to remain, exclusively Canadian.’

Interwar Isolationism

Involvement in the war transformed Canadian strategic culture. It exposed the incompatibilities between English- and French-speaking Canadians over what was to be made secure and what should be spent to do so. The Conscription Crisis of 1917 divided Canada along linguistic lines; the election of that year consigned the Conservative Party to the electoral wilderness in Québec for most of the 20th century and cemented the Liberal party’s hegemony as Canada’s ‘natural governing party’. The Conscription Crisis diminished somewhat the enthusiasm for Empire among many English-speaking Canadians, and the large numbers of Canadians who served – almost one per cent of the population of 8 million – and the very high casualty rate – 66,000 – gave rise to a Canadian form of isolation during the inter-war years. Participation in the Great War also accelerated the closer economic integration between Canada and the United States, and led directly to the Statute of Westminster (1931), which granted sovereignty to all the self-governing Dominions and formally ended the Empire. Nevertheless, Canadians were still attached to Britain in the late 1930s and supporting Britain in the Second World War was never in question for the majority. The Canadian humorist Stephen Leacock noted in 1939 that ‘If you were to ask any Canadian, “Do you have to go to war if England does?” he’d answer at once, “Oh, no.” If you then asked, “Would you go to war if England does?” he’d answer “Oh, yes.” And if you asked “Why?” he would say, reflectively, “Well, you see, we’d have to.”

The Cold War, 1945–1991

Even before war broke out, however, another transformation had occurred in strategic culture. In 1938, President Franklin D. Roosevelt publicly committed the US to defend Canada from any external threat, and Prime Minister Mackenzie King promised that Canada, for its part, would never let its territory be used for an attack on the
US. A further manifestation of this shift in strategic culture – what David Haglund has called the ‘revolution of 1940’ – occurred in August 1940 when the Ogdensburg pact established a joint mechanism for the mutual defence of North America. The subsequent emergence of a threat to the US from Soviet intercontinental bombers prompted both countries to continentalize air defence by creating a common North American Air Defense (NORAD) command in 1957, demonstrating that once again Canadians drew their security perimeter more widely than simply Canada’s borders.

A second transformation was the willingness to embrace a formal multilateral alliance as a means to security. As Cold War antagonisms intensified, Canadians eagerly pushed for a treaty that would bind the US to defend Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 reflected a willingness on the part of Canadians to identify themselves clearly as being part of the ‘West’ in what was emerging as a global confrontation. The willingness to commit, metaphorically, to a possible third European war suggests that the Second World War produced as radical a shift in Canadian sentiment as the first had.

Roussel and Théoret argue that Canada’s strategic culture after 1945 was also shaped by the embrace of ‘internationalism’ – i.e., the idea that Canada should seek security through the creation and establishment of an international order that was ‘premised upon functional, multilateralist, and institutionalist principles’. Internationalism became entrenched as a strategic norm in Canadian politics when Lester B. Pearson, the foreign minister, won the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize for his diplomacy during the 1956 Suez crisis. Peacekeeping became, as Ichikawa put it, Canada’s métier, and would very much shape Canadians’ self-perception. We argue, therefore, that Canada’s post-1945 strategic culture was characterized by three fundamental norms: close strategic integration with the United States to defend the North American continent, alliance membership in NATO and commitment to defend ‘the West’ against Soviet threats, and internationalism, particularly being prepared to contribute to, even take the lead in, peacekeeping missions.

To be sure, these key norms changed somewhat over the Cold War. In the early 1960s, the Progressive Conservative government of John Diefenbaker was undecided on the wisdom of arming Canadian forces in Europe with nuclear weapons, while Pierre Elliott Trudeau, after coming to office in 1968, halved the number of Canadian troops in Europe in the age of superpower détente. Likewise, the Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney flirted with Canadian troop reductions in 1984 before backing away after protests from other NATO allies. Yet we see nothing like the radical, conscious process of identity transformation that was attempted in Australia from the 1970s as described above.

The Post-Cold War and Post-9/11 Eras

It took the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the USSR to disrupt Canadian strategic culture. As NATO transformed and expanded, it seemed to become, at least from a Canadian perspective, more a vehicle for promoting ‘stability’ in Europe and its surrounds than the central pillar of ‘Western’ (including Canadian) security in the broader sense. The Liberal prime minister, Jean Chrétien, and his
successor, Paul Martin, began putting more distance between Canadian and American foreign policy. Mulroney had signed a Free Trade Agreement with the United States and enjoyed close relations with George H.W. Bush; this closeness was used to good effect during the 1993 election campaign by the Liberals, who promised to put more distance in the relationship. The Liberals also increasingly adopted the rhetoric of ‘human security’ while also (and less loudly) reducing Canada’s defence and foreign aid spending.

If we adopt Gray’s approach, we can see that these changes in strategic culture took place in a climate of major global structural change, prompting those who controlled Canadian strategic policy to begin experimenting with new conceptions of ‘security’. In particular, it was widely argued that Canada no longer needed to maintain large, well-equipped conventional military forces to deter Soviet aggression. Similarly, old concerns about upsetting the delicate bipolar balance by intervening in failing states for humanitarian reasons had largely dissipated. Finally, without the Soviet threat the need to maintain the very close American relationship seemed less pressing; it could now be allowed to drift or could even be cynically manipulated for domestic political advantage. In short, the post-Cold War world seemed to offer a less restrictive environment within which to make strategic policy, and Canadian policy-makers did not waste their opportunities.

Chre`tien began pursuing a more overtly independent strategic policy, opposing the US administration of Bill Clinton on such issues as landmines, National Missile Defense, nuclear weapons policy in NATO, and the use of force in the former Yugoslavia. After George W. Bush assumed the presidency in 2001, the divergence increased. While the Chre`tien government committed troops to the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the combat activities of these troops were kept as invisible as possible by the government in Ottawa; Art Eggleton, the defence minister, even absurdly promised that the Canadian troops who were part of the invasion force ‘would not go where they were not welcome’. More importantly, Chre`tien loudly refused to participate in the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, considerably souring Canadian–American relations.

Martin took over as prime minister in December 2003 promising to improve relations with the US. However, he further alienated the Bush administration by refusing to join the National Missile Defense programme (after intimating that Canada would), and by openly and publicly criticizing the United States for its stand on the Kyoto Protocol on global warming. Moreover, Martin’s election campaigns in June 2004 and January 2006 were characterized by appeals to the deep strain of anti-Americanism in Canada. The Martin government did embrace a new mission for Canadian forces in Afghanistan in 2005, committing 2000 Canadian troops to fighting the Taliban in Kandahar province, though it hid the real nature of its commitment, dressing it up as a traditional peacekeeping mission despite the fact that it was known that Canadian troops were being sent on a combat mission.

But if the alliance norms, both with respect to membership in NATO and the bilateral relationship with the US, were fading, the internationalist norm gained strength. For example, Lloyd Axworthy, Canada’s foreign affairs minister from 1996 to 2000, championed the idea of ‘human security’, the notion that Canadians should be
concerned about not only about the security of states, but the security of all human beings. To this end, in the 1990s Canada involved itself in Yugoslavia, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and East Timor. Canada also participated in the air war in Kosovo in 1999, justifying it as necessary to protect Kosovar Albanians.

However, despite the expansive nature of Axworthy’s ‘human security’ agenda, the Chrétien government dramatically reduced Canada’s international operations over the course of the 1990s, shrinking the size of the Canadian Forces significantly and reducing the development assistance and foreign affairs budgets. Although governments continued to encourage in Canadians the view that peacekeeping was Canada’s métier, Canada was no longer doing much traditional peacekeeping. Martin experimented with the idea of humanitarian intervention – at least in rhetoric if not in practice, persistently arguing that traditional conceptions of sovereignty needed amendment to permit robust action to protect human rights abuses; he claimed ‘the absence of consensus in the UN should not condemn us to inaction’ and that ‘In Kosovo, when the UN could not act, we acted, challenging Westphalian sovereignty, and we were right to do so. In Rwanda, when genocide of unbelievable ferocity took place, the world did not act, to its undying shame.’ In particular, Martin explicitly embraced the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty that argued that sovereign states had a ‘responsibility to protect’ their citizens. In May 2004 he noted that ‘failed states more often than not require military intervention in order to ensure stability’, arguing that military intervention was ‘indispensable’ (although not enough on its own) to provide long-term security. And when Martin set out his foreign policy ideas in a white paper in April 2005, what was called Canada’s ‘responsibilities agenda’ was front and centre.

But these shifts in strategic behaviour, away from the traditional reliance upon close alliance relationships with the United States and NATO and toward an unabashedly principled strategic stance, were very much a reflection of the entrenchment over the post-Cold War period of a particular strategic culture in Canada. This culture tended to conceive of Canada as essentially safe, even in the post-9/11 period, a function largely of the fact that Canadians were not targeted by jihadis in the way that Americans, Australians, British, and Spaniards were. It continued to conceive of Canada as a ‘peacekeeper’ rather than a ‘war-fighter’. As importantly, it saw the use of force in global politics as illegitimate, and conceived of the pre-emptive hegemonic projects of the Bush administration, such as the war in Iraq and the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) programme, as ill-advised and inappropriate; the widespread attachment to this strategic cultural perspective meant governments in Ottawa that refused to participate in these schemes were met with widespread applause in Canada.

The durability of this culture can best be seen by looking at the change of government that occurred after the election of 23 January 2006, when the Liberals were defeated by the Conservative party under Stephen Harper. While the new government did move quickly on some fronts in foreign policy – it sought to improve Canadian–American relations, it mothballed the International Policy Statement, it took a harder line on the Mid-East conflict, and it backed firmly away from the Kyoto Protocol – in defence policy there were none of the radical changes that had been expected.
For example, although Harper had been critical of the Chrétien government’s decision not to join the United States in the invasion of Iraq – thus allowing the Liberals to paint him as pro-Iraq war in the 2006 election campaign – once in power Harper was completely silent on the Iraq war, not offering so much as moral support for the American struggle there. Although he had been in favour of BMD while in opposition, in power Harper made clear that BMD was no longer on the agenda.

Most importantly, Harper took office just as the Canadian Armed Forces were taking up their new mission in Kandahar – and started to suffer casualties in larger numbers than at any time since the Korean War. Although it was clear that Canadian troops were openly engaged in combat, the Harper government continued to justify the mission – and the combat deaths it was producing – in largely the same terms that had been used by the Liberal government of Paul Martin in 2005: as a humanitarian mission designed to bring stability and the fruits of reconstruction and development to the people of Afghanistan, rather than, for example, as a Canadian contribution to a Western war against Islamist extremism or the US-led ‘Global War on Terror’.

In short, it could be argued that the mission in Afghanistan was justified in terms that were most consonant with the tenets of strategic culture dominant in Canada in the mid 2000s.

One could argue that Harper’s behaviour in 2006 could be explained more simply: as nothing more than a function of party politics. The Conservative government was a minority position and thus faced obvious difficulties embracing policies that radically altered Canada’s strategic policies when two of the opposition parties – the Liberals and Bloc Québécois – were not unambiguously in favour of the Afghanistan mission, and the New Democratic Party were calling for a somewhat inchoate yet popular policy calling for the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and their deployment to Darfur for humanitarian reasons.

Moreover, public opinion polls taken in late 2006 revealed significant levels of public unease with the Harper government’s direction on foreign policy. Fully 54 per cent disapproved of its performance, with almost two-thirds of these respondents saying that they ‘strongly’ disapproved; the level of support for the operation in Afghanistan was at 54 per cent; however this had fallen five points and disapproval has risen seven points to 43 per cent since June 2006. Canadians also remain poorly disposed toward the US, with 51 per cent believing that the Harper government is ‘too close’ while only 34 per cent say the relationship is ‘just right’. The gap between English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians remained, with French-speaking respondents demonstrating significantly lower levels of support (typically 20 points lower) for overseas military deployments than their English-speaking compatriots.

In short, the Harper government’s approach to defence policy in its first two years in office was entirely consistent with an electoral argument. However, that is not inconsistent with the argument that Canadian strategic culture explains why Canadians prefer a particular set of strategic behaviours, a preference to which the Conservative government chose to play. Indeed, the fact that Harper and his government have aligned their behaviour and their rhetoric with the way in which Canadians
in general conceive of their country’s strategic place in the world confirms the utility of strategic culture as a concept that helps us explain strategic behaviour.

Conclusion

We have argued that we can better understand the contemporary strategic behaviour of Australia and Canada if we look at the concept of strategic culture. Certainly, it provides a useful tool for examining and analyzing similarities and differences in how two political communities have responded to the insecurities of world politics over the course of a century.75

Looked at over the longue durée there are some striking similarities between how the contemporary strategic culture of each state evolved. Until 1919, the attachment to Empire was critical to the way in which Australians and Canadians conceived of their place in the international order, even those, such as Irish Catholics in Australia, or French-speaking Canadians, who did not share the emotional attachments of their compatriots. There was widespread support in both countries for active involvement in the war against Nazi Germany in 1939, and there was no hesitation in conceiving of Japan as the enemy even before Pearl Harbor. After 1945, both countries conceived of themselves as faithful allies of the United States, both sending troops to Korea and both cooperating militarily with the United States against the Soviet Union over a span of 45 years. There was only one glaring difference: Australia, concerned about the implications of a communist takeover of Indochina, sent troops to Vietnam, while the Canadian government remained a critic of the war.

In the post-Cold War era, shared conceptions of the ‘enemy’ largely began to fade. Prior to this, over an extended period of time, Australians and Canadians had generally agreed on who posed a threat, and who should be opposed with force: the Mahdi army in Sudan in 1885; Afrikaaners in 1899–1902; Imperial Germany and its allies from 1914 to 1918 and Nazi Germany and its allies from the late 1930s until 1945; the Soviet Union and various allies of the USSR in the decades after 1945. But the end of the Cold War began a process of drift, which has caused their contemporary strategic cultures to differ in important respects.

After the Cold War, threats were more inchoate and diffuse; and there was no widespread consensus on threat perceptions. To be sure, both Australia and Canada continued to cooperate in different ways with the United States, from the very outset of that era in 1990–1991 with the participation in the coalition put together by President George H.W. Bush to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait to the end of that era with Canadian cooperation with the United States in the war over Kosovo and Australian cooperation with the operation in East Timor. In the post-9/11 era, both countries sent troops to Afghanistan to join the United States in its efforts to oust the Taliban, and both Australians and Canadians are participating in the international campaign to prevent a resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

But while we can argue that there were some similarities between the two countries in strategic behaviour after 1991, we cannot conclude that there are the same similarities in strategic culture that we saw in earlier eras. As we argue, Australians have always had a markedly different sense of security than Canadians,
which is in part a function of a sense of being culturally very different to its Asian neighbours, and in part a function of being physically distant from whichever ‘great and powerful friend’ offered protection from time to time. Moreover, Australians have been specifically targeted by Islamist extremists on more than one occasion, and in ways that Canadians have not.

By contrast, Canadians understand, even if only inchoately, that, except for those Cold War years when Soviet nuclear weapons were aimed at Canadian targets, they have always enjoyed a high degree of security. And while Australians have historically, and more recently, been concerned with ensuring that they had a ‘great and powerful friend’ to buttress their security, Canadians have felt so secure that they can behave toward their ‘great and powerful friend’ in ways that Australians would never dream of. The shift apart was not immediately apparent, but by the end of the post-Cold War period, and certainly during the subsequent post-9/11 era, the differences have become more pronounced, both with regard to the nature of the strategic discourse that characterizes each states’ strategic musings, and with respect to each states’ patterns of strategic behaviour. In short, we feel that Australia’s contemporary strategic culture is more constrained than Canada’s. Contemporary Canadians need to worry less about security, and consequently they enjoy more freedom of action to test new ideas and concepts in the strategic realm, whilst Australians perceive themselves as having less ‘wiggle room’ given that they face a more certain constellation of threats.

In sum, we suggest that the cases of Australia and Canada confirm the utility of the concept of strategic culture. We suggest that the perspective provided by looking at a country’s strategic culture will be fuller and more robust than one that uses alternative lenses. However, we suggest that even though it is not as epistemologically ‘clean’ as some other approaches, a strategic culture approach that seeks to marry the ideational, the material, and the behavioural will yield a richer ‘explicative understanding’ of a country’s strategic behaviour.

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NOTES


11. Ibid., p. 48.


13. Ibid., pp. 51–2, 56.


18. As Elkins and Simeon note, culture may not necessarily explain ‘why alternative A was chosen over alternative B – but it may be of great help in understanding why A and B were considered, while no thought was given to C, D or E’. David Elkins and Richard Simeon, ‘A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?’ *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1979), p. 142.


26. In March 1950, Spender said in the Australian House of Representatives: ‘Should the forces of communism prevail and Vietnam come under the heel of communist China, Malaya is in danger or being outflanked and it, together with Thailand, Burma and Indonesia will become the next direct object of further communist activities’. *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates* (Australia), 9 March 1950.


42. Most Australians see ANZAC Day, 25 April, as the ‘real’ Australia Day; tens of thousands routinely gather at ANZAC Cove in Turkey, and millions more celebrate at home. See Daniel Nourry, ‘Body-Politic (National Imagery): “Lest we forget... Mateship (Empire) Right or Wrong’”, Continuum: Journal of Media & Culture Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2005), p. 372.

43. We have, for reasons of brevity, not discussed factors that may indicate a likely period within which a strategic culture influences policy-making, but we believe that there are fruitful research opportunities for investigating these matters.


53. Quoted in Robert Craig Brown, ‘Sir Robert Borden, the Great War, and Anglo-Canadian relations’, in J.L. Granatstein (ed.), Towards a New World (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1992), p. 44.


56. Nils Ørvik argued that Canadian strategy was as much directed to ‘defence against help’ as much as it was to ‘defence to help others’: ‘The Basic Issue in Canadian National Security: Defence against Help/Defence to Help Others’, Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 11 (Summer 1981).


TOWARDS AN EXPLICATIVE UNDERSTANDING OF STRATEGIC CULTURE


65. As of April 2007, approximately 60 members of the Canadian Armed Forces were serving with UN peacekeeping missions. As Prof. Andy Knight reminds us, of the 95 countries contributing to US peacekeeping missions, Canada fell from 33rd to 50th place during 2006. W. Andy Knight, ‘Canada Abandons Its Role as UN Peacekeeper’, Edmonton Journal, 12 April 2006.


71. In a Centre for Research and Information on Canada poll conducted in October 2005, fully 69% of respondents agreed that peacekeeping was ‘fundamental … to the nature of Canada’. http://www.cric.ca/pdf/cric_poll/portraits/portraits_2005/en_nature_of_canada_th.pdf


75. Not all analysts would agree. John Blaxland, for example, argues that one of the key reasons for the divergence in strategic culture between Australia and Canada is the impact of what he calls the ‘political sine waves’ being out of phase, i.e., the political orientations of the parties in power in Canberra and Ottawa differ. See Strategic Cousins (note 1), p. 227. Blaxland’s analysis is innovative, for it is true that historically the ‘sine waves’ have been out of phase, with conservatives in power in one country while liberal-progressives were in power in the other. However, we do not believe that there is evidence that significant changes in strategic choices in either country depended on whether there is a conservative or a liberal government in power. Indeed, the strategic culture argument asserts that there is a long-term secular durability in culture, even if there might be minor differences on tactical issues. Thus, one can argue, as Blaxland does, that conservative governments tend to be more pro-American than liberal governments (but not always: John Diefenbaker, Conservative prime minister of Canada from 1957 to 1963, was one of the most anti-American prime ministers of the 20th century). However, we see considerable durability in strategic culture in both Canada and Australia over an extended period of time – despite changes in government.