
TAKING ALLIES SERIOUSLY: MODEST RESPONSES BY MODEST COUNTRIES?

JODOK TROY AND CHRISTIAN LEUPRECHT

When John Hillen (1997) wrote: “Superpowers Don’t Do Windows,” he was advocating more than describing; regular American army officers wanted to “fight and win the nation’s wars decisively,” not get mired in protracted and messy policing operations. The matter of how countries *are* contributing to global stability operations is one thing, how they *ought* to contribute quite another. Distinguishing between facts and values is important: How countries *ought* to contribute to global stability does not follow from what they *are* contributing. So, there are two separate questions here: What are different countries contributing to global stability; and what should they be contributing?

Smaller democracies face a conundrum. They are not tempted to embark on expeditionary operations by themselves, and they seldom have a direct interest in the missions to which they contribute, but they do share a common interest in global stability. They benefit disproportionately from safe international trade routes and a stable international system with predictable rules. Since they are small, they are also disproportionately vulnerable to disruptions of both. They also have an interest in forestalling certain externalities associated with disrupted trade routes and political instability abroad, such as economic and conflict refugees. Their contribution can be a *quid pro quo* for the protection they enjoy under Pax Americana’s security umbrella, with the costs of maintaining armed forces and contributing to global stability still far lower than they

would have to incur if they did not enjoy the dividend that flows from American protection. Since they are maintaining armed forces anyway, they are motivated to justify their utility by sending them on expeditionary missions—a justification supported by the military profession. Not only do armed forces understand this logic, they much prefer the “away game” over the apparently mundane routine of the “home game” with the attendant risk of sliding down to the status of heavily armed gendarmes. In expeditionary operations, senior officers gain valuable experience by taking on leadership roles not available at home.

Motivations to contribute to global stability missions vary, but are often indirect rather than direct. Neack (1995) makes the case for enlightened self-interest. Political or financial credit with a major power may be important for small players (e.g., Sokolsky 2004). Participation may confer legitimacy: poorer states, with lower state legitimacy but also less political repression, contribute more frequently to African regional peacekeeping (Victor 2010). The top 10 contributors to UN missions—Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Nigeria, Ghana, Nepal, Jordan, Uruguay, Ethiopia and Kenya—as well as numerous others from Fiji to Morocco, have hard currency as their primary motivation (Monnakgotla 1996). Other countries, such as Mongolia, are in it for a different sort of “whole of government” operation: defence abroad in a conflict zone, development at home, and diplomacy in allied capitals (Mendee and Last 2008). Mongolia is in Sierra Leone and Iraq for political credit with the US, and financial credit that helps pay for an army in a poor country (i.e., 115/182 on the UN development index with a GDP per capita of US\$2,700). For poor countries, development activities abroad are not a priority, and Mongolia’s diplomatic targets are in Washington, New York and Brussels.

Still, the away game can be a difficult sell, as the electorates of contributing democracies oscillate between ambivalence and opposition. Democratic politics is premised on politicians having to repeat job interviews at regular intervals, euphemistically known as elections, so they find themselves torn: there are some rewards for good global citizenship on the one hand, but, on the other hand, expeditionary missions yield little domestic payoff. There are two reasons for this.

First, democratic electorates have an aversion to seeing their soldiers return in body bags. Dying for your country when its territorial integrity is threatened is one thing, dying for “global stability” quite another. Judging by arms advertisements—and we assume the industry knows what it is doing—casualty aversion in western democracies has increased since the end of the Cold War (Schörnig and Lembcke 2006).

Second, expeditionary missions are expensive. In addition to the costs associated with the actual mission, countries usually make long-term commitments of development aid, and they have to keep up and equip standing forces to stand at the ready for international deployment. This is not a new observation. When asked what it takes to win a

war, Philip II of Spain's aide-de-camp is famously said to have replied: "Three things: Money, money, and more money." However, the last two decades have seen a considerable shift with respect to transparency. In the past, we knew these missions were expensive but actual costs were pretty opaque. As democracies have become more fiscally transparent, so has the cost of their contribution to global stability. With democratic governments curtailing expenditures, benefits and services, and raising taxes to rein in their over-stretched coffers, expenses associated with global stability are subject to growing popular scrutiny. In democracies, the three biggest budget items tend to be national defence, health care, and education. As national debts escalate, choosing among the three increasingly becomes a zero-sum game. In public opinion surveys across smaller democracies, respondents consistently prioritize health care and education over defence, a phenomenon Samuel Huntington (1957) excoriated as "antimilitaristic liberalism." When health care costs grow by 6 percent annually but economic growth is flat, the balance has to come from somewhere. And given the sheer size of defence departments and budgets, it is virtually impossible to control public spending without affecting defence expenditures.

The costs of expeditionary stability operations result in a paradox: The costs of not participating outweigh the benefits of participating, while the costs of a full-fledged commitment outweigh the benefits of a more limited engagement. Ergo, the sub-optimal outcomes of global stability operations should come as no surprise; small states will generally make small commitments. Urlacher (2008) has developed a general theory for major contributions to UN peacekeeping, reflecting incentives and capacity. Poor states (most of the top ten contributors to UN peacekeeping) have largely economic incentives, but wealthy states (small democracies) are less likely to make major contributions unless they have colonial ties (*ibid.*). These sub-optimal outcomes are likely exacerbated by endogenous effects (group norms): The average behaviour among the group further influences the behaviour of others in that group. There are few incentives to lever, if any, that might change the behaviour of states in regard to global stability operations.

The Cold War paradigm for peacekeeping called for contributions from competent, impartial middle powers that were not embroiled in colonial or superpower machinations (*cf.* von Horn 1966). Each of the countries represented in the collection can be described in this way. Still, there has been a significant change since the end of the Cold War. Before 1989, the overarching international-security objective was to avoid Armageddon, but small democracies contributed behind the skirts of the superpowers: Peacekeeping amounted to "cold war by other means" (Maloney 2003). The "War on Terror" aside, the hope behind global stability missions since 1989 is that small democracies' collective indirect interest will add up to more than piecemeal gains of a little diplomatic credit here and a

little financial credit there. That is unlikely to materialize unless participating countries put the pieces together more effectively. This volume is, therefore, not just about describing global stability missions as they are, but also as they might be. They might be the beginning of the “system maintenance force” (Barnett 2004), but manifest not in the US Marine Corps as described by Barnett (in what amounts to a quasi-imperial police force, cf. Lyons 1999; Anderson and Killingray 1991; Marenin 1982), but an international middle class of states goaded by self-interested altruism. This is how community policing began in the English-speaking world: the middle class funded police forces that kept the cities safe for property and business (Taylor 1998; Uchida 2010). Stability operations by (relatively) impartial middle-powers can still evolve as international community policing, coexisting with the heavier-handed imperial policing of coalition and unilateral missions by major powers or big neighbours, just as the Royal Irish Constabulary and Metropolitan police models coexisted in the early 20th century (Hawkins 1991).

In the larger scheme of things though, there is reason for optimism: Results are actually better than one might expect. Historically, there has probably never been a longer period of sustained relative international peace and, as a result, affluence. The generations of democratic citizens born after the end of World War II are among the first in modern history to have been spared major international war but, consequently, do not share the pacifism that memories of war tend to induce. While the drivers of this significant aberration along the international-security timeline need not detain us here, never have smaller democracies had as big a stake in maintaining global stability and, arguably, never have they committed more troops and funds to more far-flung places to further this end. Ostensibly, then, both the proximate and distal role smaller democracies play in global stability operations is not to be underestimated.

Yet, their role has also been poorly understood, in part because this phenomenon has received comparatively little scholarly attention (when contrasted with research on actual peacekeeping missions or the US role in global stability, for instance). Smaller democracies “do windows” in many cases, as Hillen (1997) intimates, they may actually be much more proficient at it than their allied superpower(s). A curious egalitarianism pervades the international system whereby it is implicitly assumed that most countries perform most tasks equally well—or, at the very least, superpower(s) necessarily do everything better than anyone else because they can harness economies of scale. Measured in terms of outcomes, however, it turns out that this claim does not actually obtain. Smaller democracies have a comparative, perhaps absolute, advantage over their larger allies in stabilization efforts (Last 2001). The purpose of this book is to explore what they are good at, why they are good at it, and the implications that follow for the purpose of optimizing global stability operations. To this end, the book is divided into four thematic parts: the challenges

of collaboration in the changing global security environment; coordinating disarmament, development and reconstruction at the international margins; necessary and sufficient competencies for collaboration; and a final section that combines positive and normative insights into the provision of security as a common good.

In Part I, three chapters address the changing environment of global missions. Christian Leuprecht's (*Royal Military College of Canada*) structural approach details the challenge of looming demographic and fiscal changes: More "heavy lifting" will be needed to safeguard global stability while fewer countries will be able to do such heavy lifting. Soft power, closer collaboration among allies, and the need to solicit help from new participants thus become indispensable to meet demand: "Opportunities and challenges for national and international security in an aging world are substantial" and "proactive policies that are designed both to take full advantage of the opportunities created by global aging while mitigating the costs created by this phenomenon will enhance international security through the twenty-first century." In the pursuit of global stability, there are different ways of doing business.

Sarah Meharg and Kristine St-Pierre (*Pearson Peacekeeping Centre*) provide a conceptual survey of modus operandi of peace operations and crisis management and offer an overview of specific approaches that have emerged to manage complexity and make interventions more effective. Only "by understanding the nature of the security environment and how this environment shapes and influences operations" can we manage the complexity of peace operations effectively.

Drawing on qualitative evidence gathered in the field in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ingrid van Osch and Joseph Soeters (*Royal Dutch Military College*) use the United Nations Organization Mission DR Congo (MONUC) to show unequivocally just how difficult global stability work really is. Analyzing the mission using a pragmatist approach, they offer critical insights into shortcomings in legitimacy and reputation that pervade global stability operations. Ultimately, what matters is that the "host nationals desire to see the efforts of MONUC, not only symbolically, but effectively." The authors also point out the "importance of reflection and controlled experimentation in a constantly changing environment and that lessons learned need to be stored in the institutional memory of the mission." The significance of these observations lies in the fact that, rather than philosophizing, the authors draw on evidence to arrive at these conclusions inductively.

Part II deals with (re)building communities of states to facilitate the participation of smaller democracies in global stability operations. The development of the European Union's Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy (CFSP and ESDP) illustrates that there are places where states have come to expect peace, where they are working to foster such expectations, and where peace is hoped for rather than expected. Franco

Algieri and Arnold Kammel (*Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy*) examine the institutional and political framework of civilian and military operations and missions in the context of the European Union (EU) and assess how well the emerging division of labour works using Austria's participation in global stability operations as a critical case study. "Differentiation," the authors find, "might become the tool for avoiding a marginalized role of the EU in comparison to the major powers of the 21st century." For relatively small states such as Austria, participation in global stability operations is of disproportionate significance precisely because "Austria's security is indivisibly bound up with the security of the European Union." In practical terms, Austria's security policy today "continues along the lines of pragmatic neutrality by participating in EU Petersberg and NATO [partnership for peace] tasks." Therefore, although they may transcend small democracies' immediate range of geopolitical interests, countries such as Austria "will continue to take an active part in crisis management operations and missions of the European Union, be they of a civilian, military or civil-military nature."

Kai Michael Kenkel (*Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro*) shows how Brazil is emerging as an integral partner in global stability, demonstrating the comparative advantage that a rising democracy and economic power can bring to global stability operations. Southern hemispheric states, such as Brazil, are among global stability's most important troop and police contributors. The emergence of Brazil as a global power broker, however, challenges long-held orthodoxies: "The gap between the normative foundations for such missions—a modern conception of sovereignty and a concern for human rights—and more traditional motivations, such as international influence and military prestige, must be addressed." Brazil's peacebuilding approaches can serve as a new model and as a "source of fruitful insights for the established northern peacekeeping powers. Openness to the responses developed by states such as Brazil to the difficulties of new missions is an important key to meeting the challenges these interventions will bring in the future."

David Last (*Royal Military College of Canada*) argues that professional research and education can help to form transnational global stability professionals not just from the armed forces but also from the rest of government, from NGOs and from the private sector. Contrary to Huntington's functional description of armed forces, the fundamental purpose of most of today's defence forces is "not to defeat military enemies, but to combine the political, economic, and social policies of diverse small states, each with modest expeditionary forces, in order to support stabilization and development." Research and education are the means by which the necessary synergies are achieved. Drawing on examples from medicine, social policy, and military technical cooperation, the author illustrates alternative models of governing scientific and technical cooperation amongst independent contributors. Last finds "that defence universities

in small countries may be well placed to build research and education networks that will improve transnational cooperation in operations if they behave more like universities.”

Part III of the book examines in greater detail two competencies that emerge as critical to mission success: leadership and private military contractors. How do we train effective leaders and what ought to be the nature of that training? Given the differentiation of leadership tasks, the key insight of Bo Talerud (*Swedish National Defence Academy*) is that different sorts of leadership might be required—leadership that is sensitive both to collaboration and to learning. The shoemaker knows how to make a shoe, but he does not know where it pinches; so, learning collaboratively and fostering collaborative learning are important leadership roles. Leadership, especially transformational leadership, is ubiquitous in military research and practice; but less work has been done on followers, workers and the way they react to different types of leadership. If the military leaders are fostered in a leader-oriented authoritarian culture, then is it really all that surprising when they have trouble cooperating with different players, such as civil and foreign organizations? Mission success demands a more collaborative leader, with the ability to transfer knowledge, exchange ideas, and effect changes in behaviour.

The sort of leader Talerud describes is important in work with the growing number of private security and military companies (PSMCs). Gerhard Kümmel (*Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences, Germany*) prods us to rethink the basic idea behind privatization. Rather than assuming that PSMCs are a natural and inevitable component of global stability operations, scholars following the tradition of Morris Janowitz (1960) raise concerns about the civilianization of missions. It turns out, for instance, that PSMCs, while quite effective at some levels, are more costly for core functions. The evidence suggests that now, more than ever, public must be weighed carefully against private interests, and economic motivations ought not trump policy objectives outright. More than ever, future research on PSMCs needs to build a stronger evidence base: “Access contractors and access soldiers through qualitative or quantitative research; look at the diversity of contractors and at the diversity within the military to determine where and why military-contractor relations and cooperation are easier to achieve; and identify best practices with regard to contract oversight.”

Finally, Part IV of the volume explores how to operationalize the collaboration, competencies, and cooperation of the earlier chapters in a way that shares the burden among great, middle, and small powers while optimizing outcomes. Ironically, while trust is one of the means to this end, trust is inherently more problematic in hostile areas than in stable ones. How, then, can we tell whether trust is fragile or robust? What sorts of governance structures foster or undermine trust? Megan Thompson and Ritu Gill (*Defence Research and Development Canada, Toronto*) review key

results from the trust literature to identify the formal and organizational reinforcement that is required to build robust trust among countries, allies, and locals. They observe that the increased complexity of today's peace operations "is reflected in the focus on whole of government (WoG) responses that seek to integrate various government agencies within a single mission space and mandate." The authors vividly illustrate that "optimal effectiveness and efficiency is best facilitated by relationships that are based upon the notion of trust."

Donna Winslow (*US Army Logistics University*) examines one of the thornier subjects in these new missions: the social scientists and especially the anthropologist's contribution to human terrain systems. "Do no harm to the subject being studied" is the prevailing academic mantra. But scholars do not know how the data they provide will be used. Without civilian oversight and review, the military has no way of knowing the reliability of the information that is being provided. Winslow's chapter details the shift from potentially coercive social science—or its potentially nefarious application—to a more collaborative social science that is less prone to abuse and more likely to serve the common good. Ethnographic knowledge, "is not something to be collected like sea shells and placed in a classificatory grid; it emerges in the ethnographic occasion, which is the encounter between the ethnographer and the persons with whom the ethnographer produces the knowledge." Winslow makes a strong case for civilian social scientists to continue "studying military and intelligence organizations from the inside and educating the military about its own organizational culture and about other cultures and societies so that the military can carry out its own cultural intelligence operations."

In the concluding chapter David Last (*Royal Military College of Canada*) encapsulates this shift from coercive to collaborative operations by focusing on the rule of law, its purpose, the need to be consistent, and the dangers of hypocrisy and contradiction in building rule-of-law societies abroad: The "rule of law at home and democratic oversight of security services is linked to respect for internal debates abroad, including debates about social mores and market reforms." Comparing the examples of four transnational missions under the United Nations in terms of the involvement of small powers, the author infers: "Collaborative and consensual stabilization involving many small and supportive democracies is more likely to be associated with stable outcomes." The reason, Last surmizes, is that smaller democracies are more inclined to "a strategy of community building in which state policies are sensitive to the imposition of rules on others, including secession and incorporation of territory."

Smaller democracies can make an important contribution to global stability. In the emerging security environment, they can develop new competencies, build communities at the margins, and work collaboratively with other small states. Their strategic partnership is a function of the

comparative advantages they enjoy in building institutions, working at the transnational level, with international and local communities and in multinational operations. From the perspective of “modest” democracies, the challenge of global stability operations in the 21st century is to bring together small democratic powers to project stabilization missions globally in support of a consensus that will survive a changing world order. The objective, therefore, is to reject the technological “fantasy” of high-tech war (e.g., Singer 2009) and instead understand the challenges that new missions face in terms of their social context of violence.

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