The World in Canada
Diaspora, Demography,
and Domestic Politics

Edited by
DAVID CARMENT AND
DAVID BERCUSON

McGill-Queen's University Press
Montreal & Kingston • London • Ithaca
Contents

Acknowledgments ix

Introduction 3
DAVID CARMENT AND DAVID BERCUSON

1 A Question of Degree: The Prime Minister, Political Leadership, and Canadian Foreign Policy 16
ADAM CHAPNICK

2 Assessing the Impact of Recent Immigration Trends on Canadian Foreign Policy 31
ELIZABETH RIDDELL-DIXON

3 Jamaica, Haiti, and the Role of Diasporas 50
ANDREW HARRINGTON, STEWART PREST, AND PER UNHEIM

4 Multiculturalism and Canadian Foreign Policy 78
J.L. GRANATSTEIN

5 The Parizeau-Chrétien Version: Ethnicity and Canadian Grand Strategy 92
DAVID G. HAGLUND

6 Muslim Communities: The Pitfalls of Decision-Making in Canadian Foreign Policy 109
SAMI AOUN

7 Just How Liberal and Democratic Is Canadian Foreign Policy? 123
CHRISTIAN LEUPRECHT AND TODD HATALEY
Contents

8 Public Perceptions of Canada-US Relations: Regionalism and Diversity 149
   EVAN POTTER

   STÉPHANE ROUSSEL AND CHARLES-ALEXANDRE THÉORÈT

10 Interpreting Quebec’s International Relations: Whim or Necessity? 189
   NELSON MICHAUD

   Conclusion: Putting Canada’s Diversity into Canadian Foreign Policy 206
   DAVID BERGUSON AND DAVID CARMENT

   Bibliography 217
   Contributors 249
   Index 247
6 Aid to Iraq includes partial debt-forgiveness.
8 For example the G8 Member States' 22-23 January 2002 meeting in Ottawa for the elaboration of legal measures to combat the financing of terrorism.
9 For further analysis, see Bethany Barratt, "Canadian Foreign Policy and International Human Rights," in Patrick James, Nelson Michaud, and Marc O'Reilly, eds, Handbook of Canadian Foreign Policy, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006.
10 For a presentation on these relations, see www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/middle_east/menu-fr.asp.
11 The first Intifada began in 1987.

7
Just How Liberal and Democratic Is Canadian Foreign Policy?
CHRISTIAN LEUPRECHT AND TODD HATALEY

INTRODUCTION

We wondered why Canadian foreign and defense priorities (outputs) appear to diverge markedly from Canadian public opinion (inputs) on foreign and defense policy. In this chapter we seek to postulate a plausible explanation for this puzzle – the institutional constraints imposed by Canada’s relationship with the United States complemented by growing structural constraints due to greater ethnocultural heterogeneity – and work out the broader implications for Canadian democracy. Rather than being aligned with the will of “the Canadian people,” this chapter hypothesizes that Canadian foreign policy is actually structurally contingent upon the Canada-US relationship as well as institutionally contingent upon a ruling political party and its elite whose horizon is the next federal election. With the Statute of Westminster of 1931, Canada as a country may have become sovereign in the area of foreign policy, but sovereignty for the Canadian “people” in the area of foreign policy, by contrast, remains a work in progress – one that, due to exogenous and endogenous constraints, may be unattainable. If this chapter’s argument turns out to be tenable, it follows with a high degree of probability that the misalignment between Canadian foreign policy and the will of the Canadian people is a permanent phenomenon of democracy in Canada.

Although it is now little more than a historical relic, the Paul Martin Liberal Government’s (2004-06) International Policy Statement can
still serve as a benchmark. It encapsulated an attempt – however erratic, chaotic, and rushed – at crafting a cohesive mission statement on the one hand and at formulating Canadian foreign policy responsibly and democratically on the other. The first section of this study uses a systems-analytic approach to provide a cursory overview of the IPS, which we then contrast with (1) the process of public consultation that was involved in crafting the document and (2) public opinion on the subject matter. The second section subjects to empirical scrutiny two hypotheses – one exogenous, the other endogenous in explanatory character – that purportedly explain this divergence. The first proposition is premised on an institutionalist approach that seeks to develop “more explicit theorizing on the reciprocal influence of institutional constraints and political strategies and, more broadly, on the interaction of ideas, interests, and institutions” (Thelen and Steinmo, 14). This first proposition postulates that, insofar as foreign and defense policy is concerned, the Canadian capacity to act in a sovereign manner – and thus its capacity to govern democratically – is contingent upon Canada-US relations. As Charles Doran observes: “If the United States tends to look outward toward the world system, Canada, because of its size and priorities, tends to look towards the United States” (38).

The second proposition has a statist rational-choice premise. Inherent to party politics in a democracy is the governing political party’s goal to get re-elected. In the Westminster parliamentary system, this constraint is especially pronounced when the party in power has to govern as a minority. Since few studies have dealt with political parties as a domestic source of foreign policy (Haas; Holsti, 192–3; Risse-Kappen; Simmons, 281) and taken into account domestic institutions and collective political actors as foundations of foreign policy (Hudson and Vore, 219; Risse-Kappen, 484–5; Hagan 1993, 26–31; Hagan 1995, 197), this study’s contribution to the political circumstances that exacerbate the magnitude and nature of the influence of partisan politics on foreign policy has ramifications beyond this chapter. The chapter draws on two case studies to test this point. First, it contrasts the economic-policy priorities of Canadians with those of business interests and then looks at how these interests might – or might not – be reflected in voting patterns. Second, it contrasts spending on overseas development assistance (ODA) and recent deployments of the Canadian Forces’ Disaster Assistance Team (DART) with voter concentration and support in some key urban areas across Canada.

The broader implications of this analysis for pluralist democracy in Canada are discussed in the conclusion. Pluralism presumes that all members of society share interests with some other members. Pluralism, as a theory of politics, has as its premise that society as a collection of groups’s defined by differing interests (Dahl 1956). Pluralist theory, therefore, holds a healthy liberal-democracy to be one where (1) there is widespread citizen participation in group life, (2) groups can freely form and compete for political influence, (3) there is fair and equal competition among groups in the political arena, (4) no one group possesses a disproportionately large share of resources to influence government decision-making, and (5) public policies accurately reflect the balance of power among groups (Connolly, 3–4). How does the IPS measure up against these criteria? The chapter’s analysis confirms the neopatrimonial caveat that money, organization, and leadership seem to work in favour of business interests and that, as a result, one would expect their interests to be reflected disproportionately in the policymaking process and outcomes (Dahl 1985). Yet, two other constraints emerge that moderate this finding. One is the growing importance of demographic change, its impact on political behaviour, and its consequences. The other is the轼executive constraint imposed by Canada’s geostrategic location. The analysis in this chapter suggests that these contingencies present a formidable challenge for pluralist democracy in Canada. Pluralist democracy presumes that individual interests are represented and aggregated by interest groups and, subsequently, by political parties. Such is the constructivist take on foreign policy: international relations theory in general and foreign policy in particular cannot be understood in isolation from domestic politics (Waltz; London; Rosenau 1967, 1997; Hughes; Piper and Terchek; Smith; Kohn; and Nye, 267; Milner, 492; Maoz; Delvoie; Ignatieff). The most fundamental transformations of our time cannot be explained by international factors alone (Kratochwil, 63).

However, the analysis in this chapter suggests that the converse may obtain as well: with respect to foreign policy, political parties and elites are subservient not to the way in which values and principles are institutionalized at the domestic level in general (Thérien
and Noël 1994, 2000) but to particular domestic interests. Jean-Jacques Rousseau famously distinguished between the “general will” and the “will of all” (book II). The former is a sort of common interest that transcends and stands above the particular interests aggregated in the form of the latter. The IPS may represent a moment in Canadian foreign policy when the ruling political party endeavoured to align the “general will” more closely with the “will of all.” If that was indeed one of its purposes though, this chapter posits that momentary realignment to have been thwarted by institutional and structural constraints. Depending on whether those constraints converge or diverge, however, the trajectory of these two constraints is bound to have interesting implications for Canadian foreign policy and the way it balances its relations with the United States relative to those with the rest of the world.

**Canada’s International Policy Statement**

In 1993, the Liberal Caucus Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, chaired by future Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy, committed the Liberal Party of Canada to the “democratization of foreign policy” in its *Liberal Foreign Policy Handbook* and subsequently to a more “open process for foreign policy making” in the so-called Red Book election platform. To expand the ideas, options, and advice available to the minister, policymaking was to become more responsive (Lee, 64). The results, however, were mixed (Ayers, 498–504).

In the run up to the IPS, the then Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) started an online dialogue website with weekly updates that attracted sixty thousand hits in the first six months of 2003 (Canada 2003). In addition, representatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs held fifteen town-hall meetings across the country with the minister, a session with the National Forum of Youth, and nineteen expert roundtables and meetings with provincial and territorial governments. Purportedly, Canadian foreign policy as set out subsequently in the IPS thus “reflects the views expressed by Canadians during the 2003 Dialogue on Foreign Policy, the 2002–2003 Defence Update and consultations on aid effectiveness” (Government of Canada).

After reviewing the process Jeffrey Ayres concluded: “It is doubtful that much more consensus exists today between government officials and civil society groups than existed ten years earlier in terms of determining what is meant by the democratization of foreign policy” (506). One might infer, as Kim Nossal cautioned early on, that efforts to democratize foreign policy are simply an “elusive ideal” (1995). The more interesting question, however, is why Foreign Affairs consults in the first place. Is it to clarify to the government what Canadians want? Or does it consult to put it in the clear when asked if Canadians have had any input into the making of foreign policy?

The purpose of this section is to provide – as objectively as possible – a cursory overview of Canadian foreign policy as it is set out in the IPS. In keeping with the structure of the IPS, we shall differentiate between two areas of foreign policy: the Canadian role in the North American community and the Canadian role in the global community. The most recent overhaul of Canadian foreign policy, tabled in Parliament on 19 April 2005 is the latest instalment in an “integrated” Canadian approach to foreign policy. According to former Liberal Prime Minister Martin, rapid and radical global change necessitated the need to recast Canadian foreign policy. The proliferation of new, failed, and failing states, global terrorism, disease, climate change, and non-state actors threatens to diminish the international clout of smaller countries, such as Canada, turning it from a middle power to a little power (Welsh). Martin figured that Canadian interests would be served best by a stable and prosperous global environment. That line of thinking, of course, is nothing new. It actually reflects the traditional “closet” realism that marks Canadian foreign policy. Martin wanted to adjust Canadian foreign policy to this end. That meant actively promoting Canadian interests and values abroad for the purpose of maintaining a position of influence in the global community, while at the same time ensuring the prosperity and security of Canadians.

The fundamentals of Canadian foreign policy thus remain unchanged since Canadian foreign policy’s last review in 1995 (Canada 1995). Canadian foreign policy is guided by three basic principles. First, foreign policy shall be premised on the “joint pursuit of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.” Second, Canadian foreign policy shall maintain a commitment to free-market principles and a commitment to shared risk and the equality of opportunity. Third, Canada remains committed to the development of multilateral institutions and multilateral governance.
The IPS differentiates the goals that flow from these principles by two geographic areas: goals that apply to Canada and the North American community, and goals that apply to Canada’s position in the international community. The continentalist priorities are:

1. collaborate with the United States and Mexico to protect North American territory and citizens from twenty-first-century threats;
2. protect Canada and Canadians by implementing the National Security Policy, and updating the approach that the Canadian Forces take to domestic operations;
3. establish Canada as an attractive business gateway for those establishing a foothold in North America;
4. develop deeper knowledge of, and new channels of influence with, the United States and Mexico;
5. collaborate with our regional partners to build a competitive economic space that facilitates the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people and enhances the quality of life of all North Americans.

The internationalist priorities are:

1. contribute to UN, NATO, and G8 efforts to counteract terrorist organizations and cut off their support networks;
2. establish a Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) to plan and coordinate rapid and integrated civilian responses to international crises;
3. maintain combat-capable Canadian Forces, focused on the challenge of restoring peace and stability to failed and fragile states;
4. prevent the spread and reduce the existing stocks of WMDs;
5. strengthen international export control regimes on proliferation-sensitive technologies and build the capacity of countries to enforce them;
6. optimize Canada’s economic framework;
7. develop new frameworks to promote trade and investments with our mature markets, while reaching out to take advantage of emerging economic giants;
8. create a level playing field in international trade and investment through active participation in the WTO;
9. pursue sustainable development through both domestic and international strategies;
10. refocus Canadian development assistance to target states with the greatest need and greatest potential for successful intervention;
11. focus our contribution to the Millennium Development goals on governance, private sector development, health, basic education, and environmental sustainability;
12. establish Canada Corps as a key mechanism for providing governance assistance to developing countries;
13. contribute ideas, expertise, and resources to reform efforts aimed at improving the effectiveness and legitimacy of existing international institutions;
14. revitalize Canada’s core international relationships, while strengthening our ties with key “pathfinder” states and organizations;
15. strengthen Canada’s influence in the Western hemisphere;
16. create a new framework for international policymaking that engages multiple departments and levels of government;
17. support the good international work of existing networks of Canadians.3

Central to the integrated approach to foreign policy is the Canada-US relationship. At a macro level, economic and security ties to the United States have enabled Canada to advance domestic and international issues. The predicament thus precipitated recognizes, on the one hand, the need for an institutionalized relationship with the United States and, on the other, the potential consequences for Canadian sovereignty. In other words, an internal contradiction marks Canada-US relations in general and the IPS specifically: the Canada-US relationship is key to enhancing Canadian sovereignty - but it has the potential to reduce it as well.

Canada’s perilous walk along this tightrope has been highlighted further in the post-9/11 period as Canada has been forced to deal more directly with US security concerns inherent in the shared space of the Canada-US relationship. As a result, the Canadian Government has made it a priority to “engage cooperatively with the US on measures that directly affect Canadian territory and citizens, and to maintain our ability to influence how the North American continent is defended” (FAC 2005). Pursuant to the logic of the IPS, the Advanced Passenger Information/Passenger Name Record (API/PRN), the Container Security Initiative (CSI), the Customs
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), the Safe Third Country Agreement, and the Smart Border Declaration all manifest Canada’s national interests.

The government acknowledges that it is in the best interests of Canada to strengthen relations with the United States, particularly where trade and economic links are concerned. How then is it that the “national interest” – as concretized by a democratically elected government – does not neatly map on to the desires of the Canadian population?

PEOPLE VERSUS INSTITUTIONS

In a series of four recent polls4 – taken between April 2004 and October 2005 for the express purpose of gauging Canadian attitudes toward foreign policy – a distinct pattern emerges: although Canadians and Americans always put the opposite country near or at the top of the countries with which they identify most closely (O’Reilly), those surveyed repeatedly expressed their desire to search for alternatives to the dependence Canada now has on its US neighbours. As visualized in figure 1, Pollara’s poll from April 2004 found that 48 percent of Canadians felt that Canada should focus more on its relations with other countries of the world, as opposed to 35 percent who believed in its foreign relations Canada should focus primarily on the United States. However, Canada’s demographic concentration somewhat falsifies the aggregate results. Whereas Quebecers, Ontarians, and British Columbians tend to have internationalist leanings, the Prairies and Atlantic Canada tend to be more continentalist. Even there, though, continentalist feelings are moderate compared to the fairly strong internationalism elsewhere in the country.

The Innovative Research Group’s poll taken in November 2004 posed the question of Canada-US relations slightly differently, asking whether or not Canada should pursue a foreign policy that focuses on Canada’s ability to influence the United States. In this instance, 52 percent of respondents opposed the US-centric approach of Canada’s foreign policy. Ipsos-Reid’s poll, released on 11 October 2005, asked if Canadians favoured an independent foreign policy even at the expense of causing a rift in Canada-US relations; 83 percent of respondents agreed that an independent foreign policy should trump the Canada-US relationship. Finally,

Innovative Research Group’s poll released on 31 October 2005, found that a majority of Canadians questioned the reliability of the United States within the Canada-US relationship. Fully 72 percent of respondents agreed that Canada would be better off deepening relations with other countries. A trend emerges of a discrepancy between the goals of the government vis-à-vis Canada’s relationship with the United States and the desires of Canadians in general.

It could be argued that a US-centric foreign policy is simply the logical outcome of Canada’s physical, economic, and political location in the world. A model of institutional constraint, however, posits a more parsimonious explanation. Institutional approaches to understanding policy choices are concerned with analyzing the effects of rules and procedures on the preferences expressed by human actors (Immergut). Institutions have two roles: they constrain some behaviours while inducing others. Institutions are mediators that privilege some interpretations (over others), either in the goals that political actors seek to achieve or in the means they use to achieve these goals. Institutions do not determine behaviour. However, they “provide a context for actions that helps us to understand
why actors make the choices they do” (Immergut). March and Olsen define institutions as a “relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations.” Practices and rules, they maintain, are embedded in “structures of meanings and schemes of interpretations that explain and legitimize particular identities and the practices and rules associated with them.” Borrowing from Émile Durkheim, they contend that practices and rules are embedded in the resources – and the way those resources are allocated – which make it possible for individuals and collectivities to act in a certain way, and to penalize those that deviate from the “norm.”

Assessing the position of the United States in the Canadian foreign-policy equation, an institutional approach would posit structural constraints as playing perhaps not a deterministic role but, at a minimum, as framing the climate in which Canadian foreign policy concerning the United States is forged. Accordingly, actors that function within the structural boundaries created by the institutional relationship, and who have the resources to influence policy development within the given constraints, hold a hegemonic position.

From the IPS one might deduce a Canadian preoccupation with economic security: “establishing Canada as an attractive gateway for those establishing a foothold in North America” and to “collaborate with our regional partners to build a competitive economic space.” The same preoccupation spans Canada’s National Security Policy – Securing a Free and Open Society: it is in Canada’s economic interests to ensure that Canada is neither a base of operations nor a gateway to the United States for terror groups (Canada 2004). Ergo, stronger cross-border law enforcement, counterterrorism programs, and infrastructure development and improvement all serve to secure Canada’s economic ties to the United States. In this light, the economic elite should be the best positioned to influence the development of Canada’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States. The role played by elite economic actors in the development of Canadian policy toward the United States should come as no surprise given the dependence of the Canadian economy on the US market.

The role of economic elites in the process of setting the foreign-policy agenda is further evidenced by the degree to which the section of the IPS dealing with the Canada-US relationship concurs with and supports the US homeland security agenda. Birkland’s study on policymaking and agenda-setting after disasters and catastrophic events maintains that policy changes after “focusing events” will reflect the preference of certain segments of society. Advocates of policy change reap substantial benefits from focusing on events because they shore up the perception that previous policies were a failure. The status quo (ante) becomes unacceptable. As a focusing event of unparalleled magnitude, 9/11 was an opportunity to promote the development of mechanisms that would ensure the viability of Canada’s economic linkages to the United States.

The centre-piece of this agenda, the Smart Border Declaration, was heavily endorsed by the Coalition for Secure and Trade-Efficient Borders. The Coalition is part of the Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters Association, one of the largest business coalitions ever formed in Canadian history. Perrin Beatty, former Conservative Cabinet minister in the Mulroney administration and now President and CEO of the Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters Association spearheaded the development and lobby efforts of the Coalition for Secure and Trade-Efficient Borders. He told Canadian Ports Magazine that the Smart Border Declaration signalled a recognition on the part of the Canadian Government to accept recommendations made by the coalition. Applying Birkland’s thesis to this outcome suggests that the Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters Association was well-placed to use its resources effectively to influence the development of Canadian policy toward the United States, specifically the economic agenda.

If Canadian policy toward the United States is a matter of elite accommodation, then the process is captured by the neoplastic model of policymaking. In this paradigm, economic actors, by virtue of their financial, organizational, leadership, and networking resources, figure prominently. The case study thus supports the neoplastic assertion that economic elites have disproportionate clout over the policymaking process. For neoplaxists, that is old news. What is news, however, is the apparent clout of non-economic, ethnocultural groups as it emerges below.

**CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE**

By its own admission, the strategy taken by the Canadian Government in the distribution of official development assistance (ODA) is
intended to advance Canadian interests in the global community. As stated in the IPS: “Canada will strive to make a greater difference in fewer places. In so doing, we will further the interests of our development partners, the international community at large and Canada itself” (Canada 2005). This strategy of tying aid to national interest is part of a growing trend in Canada that regards aid with increasingly commercial motives (Macdonald and Hoddinott). That approach deviates ever so slightly from the more altruistic approach to ODA, which Cooper has called a pillar of Pearsonian internationalism that shaped Canadian foreign policy for so many years.

The trend of using ODA to further Canada’s interests is incontrovertible. But who decides and what constitutes “Canadian interests”? Can “national interests” be homogeneous in a pluralist society such as Canada? Noël et al. observe differential attitudes toward ODA between two groups they distinguish as liberal and conservative internationalists. This distinction, they argue, is a function of domestic and partisan differences. Insofar, then, as foreign policy in general and ODA policy specifically are contingent, one might posit domestic and partisan politics as a point of departure.

Polling evidence indicates that a majority of Canadians endorse development spending as a form of financial aid (Noël et al.). Ipsos-Reid (2005) found that 54 percent of Canadians made “helping reduce hunger and poverty around the world” a top priority for Canadian foreign policy. A poll by Pollara (2004) eighteen months earlier, by contrast, found that only 24 percent of Canadians deemed spending more on foreign aid to be in the interest of Canadians. These results highlight a contrast identified by Noël et al. in the domestic attitude toward spending on development assistance: whereas most Canadians agreed that foreign aid matters, that is not necessarily reflected in the government’s program. A reduction in spending as a percentage of GDP during the 1980s and 1990s notwithstanding (Smillie), when public satisfaction with spending on foreign aid is tracked over the long term, Canadians generally feel the government is spending enough on development assistance. From these findings one may infer that although Canadians stress spending on aid and development, the issue does not garner much attention and Canadians are generally satisfied with the performance of the government in this area. This begs a question: insofar as it is not really a highly politically charged issue, if the Canadian public is inattentive to spending on foreign aid, what motivates the government’s formulation of ODA policy?

It is a truism in Canadian foreign policy to observe that as a trading nation it is in Canada’s best interests to work toward maintaining a stable global order that allows for the maintenance and development of external markets for Canadian products. The IPS does not depart from this goal with regards to ODA: “The establishment of good governance in other societies around the globe will make Canadians safer and more prosperous. In a globalized world, where threats are transnational and greater wealth depends upon deeper forms of exchange, the creation of stable and capable states will form a major part of Canada’s global agenda” (Canada 2005). The inference that ODA is somehow tied to the development and maintenance of global markets to advance Canada’s economic interests gives some indication as to the catalysts that drive ODA spending. Ergo, one would expect ODA distribution to reflect Canadian trade patterns. From this public-choice perspective, one would expect ODA to be concentrated in geographic areas with the greatest potential for increased returns from trade. However, according to the Statistical Report on Official Development Assistance for the 2003-04 fiscal year prepared by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the top three recipients of Canadian development aid in 2003-2004 were: Iraq, Afghanistan and Ethiopia (Canada 2003-04).

These countries are hardly significant trading partners for Canada. To illustrate the point, tables 1, 2, and 3 evidence just how relatively insignificant Canada’s trading relationship with Afghanistan used to be. Compare the steep rise in exports to Afghanistan since 2001 with the moderate growth of exports to Iraq and Canada’s flattening trade relationship with Ethiopia.

By 2005 Canada exported about 120 times the amount to Afghanistan it did only four years earlier. Most of this growth is a function of ODA. Contrasting exports with imports for Afghanistan thus belies the claim that the primary purpose of ODA for Canada is to promote economic prosperity.

Figure 2 shows that, a decade ago, neither Afghanistan nor Iraq were a foreign-aid priority for the United States. A decade later, both countries find themselves among the top recipients of USAID development aid. This development is significant in that the figures show that a handful of countries tend to receive the bulk of USAID
Table 1
Afghanistan, Trade Balances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Exports</td>
<td>167,371</td>
<td>1,884,503</td>
<td>9,022,516</td>
<td>9,673,121</td>
<td>19,069,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Imports</td>
<td>415,608</td>
<td>354,440</td>
<td>618,889</td>
<td>374,099</td>
<td>457,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Balance</td>
<td>-248,237</td>
<td>1,520,063</td>
<td>8,403,627</td>
<td>9,299,022</td>
<td>18,611,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Exports</td>
<td>404,084,905,376</td>
<td>396,376,122,913</td>
<td>380,856,973,072</td>
<td>411,792,178,783</td>
<td>435,622,306,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Imports</td>
<td>343,110,092,319</td>
<td>348,848,818,990</td>
<td>335,961,864,210</td>
<td>355,710,302,137</td>
<td>379,576,151,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Balance</td>
<td>60,974,813,657</td>
<td>47,527,303,923</td>
<td>44,895,108,862</td>
<td>56,081,876,646</td>
<td>56,046,155,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (all countries)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Exports</td>
<td>404,085,073,347</td>
<td>396,378,007,416</td>
<td>380,865,995,588</td>
<td>411,801,851,904</td>
<td>435,641,376,472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Imports</td>
<td>343,110,507,927</td>
<td>348,849,183,430</td>
<td>335,962,483,099</td>
<td>355,710,676,236</td>
<td>379,576,609,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Balance</td>
<td>60,974,565,420</td>
<td>47,528,823,986</td>
<td>44,903,512,489</td>
<td>56,091,175,668</td>
<td>56,064,767,199</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source of data: Statistics Canada

Table 2
Iraq, Trade Balances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Exports</td>
<td>6,669</td>
<td>13,667</td>
<td>5,425</td>
<td>31,520</td>
<td>75,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Imports</td>
<td>874,059</td>
<td>1,089,670</td>
<td>1,126,295</td>
<td>1,101,571</td>
<td>1,206,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Balance</td>
<td>-867,389</td>
<td>-1,076,004</td>
<td>-1,120,870</td>
<td>-1,099,951</td>
<td>-1,130,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Exports</td>
<td>404,078,404</td>
<td>396,364,341</td>
<td>380,860,571</td>
<td>411,770,232</td>
<td>435,565,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Imports</td>
<td>342,236,449</td>
<td>347,759,513</td>
<td>334,836,188</td>
<td>354,609,105</td>
<td>378,370,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Balance</td>
<td>61,841,955</td>
<td>48,604,828</td>
<td>46,024,383</td>
<td>57,161,126</td>
<td>57,195,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (all countries)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Exports</td>
<td>404,085,073,073</td>
<td>396,378,007,416</td>
<td>380,865,996,966</td>
<td>411,801,851,904</td>
<td>435,641,376,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Imports</td>
<td>343,110,507,927</td>
<td>348,849,183,430</td>
<td>335,962,483,099</td>
<td>355,710,676,236</td>
<td>379,576,609,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Balance</td>
<td>60,974,565,420</td>
<td>47,528,823,986</td>
<td>44,903,512,489</td>
<td>56,091,175,668</td>
<td>56,064,767,199</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source of data: Statistics Canada
Table 3
Ethiopia, Trade Balances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Exports</td>
<td>7,075</td>
<td>6,034</td>
<td>23,873</td>
<td>15,140</td>
<td>26,936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Imports</td>
<td>6,072</td>
<td>6,111</td>
<td>6,060</td>
<td>6,421</td>
<td>8,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Balance</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>-77</td>
<td>17,812</td>
<td>8,719</td>
<td>18,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Exports</td>
<td>404,077,998</td>
<td>396,371,973</td>
<td>380,842,123</td>
<td>411,786,712</td>
<td>435,614,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Imports</td>
<td>343,104,436</td>
<td>348,843,073</td>
<td>335,956,423</td>
<td>355,704,255</td>
<td>379,567,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Balance</td>
<td>60,973,562</td>
<td>47,528,901</td>
<td>44,885,700</td>
<td>56,082,457</td>
<td>56,046,464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (all countries)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Exports</td>
<td>404,085,073</td>
<td>396,378,007</td>
<td>380,865,996</td>
<td>411,801,852</td>
<td>435,641,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Imports</td>
<td>343,110,508</td>
<td>348,849,183</td>
<td>335,962,483</td>
<td>355,710,676</td>
<td>379,576,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Balance</td>
<td>60,974,565</td>
<td>47,528,824</td>
<td>44,903,512</td>
<td>56,091,176</td>
<td>56,064,767</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada

Figure 3: Regional distribution of USAID funds, 1994 and 2004

Figure 4: Top foreign countries receiving USAID funds, 1994 and 2004

Figure 5: Top foreign aid recipients, FY 2004

In so far as the pattern of the distribution of aid is concerned, it is all the more remarkable in light of figure 3, which shows a precipitous decline in the proportion of USAID spending devoted to the Middle East over the same period (with much of the balance being diverted to South Asia), in so far as the pattern of the distribution of aid is concerned, the overlapping appears to overlap. One may speculate, however, in view of the divergent approaches to foreign interests. However, in view of the divergent approaches to foreign policy illustrated by the Martin and Bush administrations, this line

[Figures and text are not transcribed due to the nature of the task.]
Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number before 1961</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Number 1991–2001</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total immigrants</td>
<td>894,465</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,830,688</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>217,175</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>197,360</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>147,320</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>156,120</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>96,770</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>122,010</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>79,710</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>118,383</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>44,340</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>62,590</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>34,810</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>57,990</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>27,425</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>53,755</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>21,240</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>51,440</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>20,755</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>47,080</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China, People’s Republic</td>
<td>15,850</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>43,370</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada.

1 Includes data up to 15 May 2001.

Of reasoning seems tenuous at best. A more plausible explanation might be that ODA enhances Canada’s economic security by playing strongly to the foreign-aid priorities of its largest trading partner, the United States. The distribution of Canadian ODA does not reflect democratic preferences – provided those even exist. As a tool of foreign policy, however, ODA is used to further the goals of the Canadian economic elite as part of the larger strategy of maintaining strong economic ties with the United States. Realism, in other words, does not trump economics. Instead, the evidence confirms Joel Sokolsky’s assertion that the two are linked: economics is impossible without security, and security is impossible without economics.

The case of Canadian bilateral ODA is also telling. Although in the overall scheme of things Haiti ranked twelfth in terms of total bilateral assistance dispersed by Canada in 2004, Haiti and Nigeria are the two countries in the world where Canada ranks among the top three donor countries (Canada 2003–04, table T). Mali and Pakistan are the only countries where Canada ranks in the top four. In many cases, Canada averages sixth. In other words, for Canada to rank among the top three or four donors to a particular country is unusual. Clearly, a decision was made to single out certain countries. Like Canada, Haiti and Mali belong to La Francophonie. As table 4 shows, Pakistan ranks among the top source countries for immigration to Canada.

Ahead of Pakistan in terms of immigrants to Canada ranks Sri Lanka. As may reasonably be inferred from figure 4, a relationship is plausible between where in Canada these immigrants settle and that – after many years of sitting mostly idle – in rapid succession these two countries also happened to be the sites of two recent deployments of the CF’s DART.

Figure 4 shows that immigrants from Haiti, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka settle in specific metropolitan clusters: Haitians overwhelmingly tend to settle in Montreal, Pakistanis and Sri Lankans tend to settle predominantly in Toronto. If the network theory of migration holds, we would expect each community to concentrate in specific parts of the city. Indeed, figures 5, 6, and 7, in turn, confirm a disproportionate concentration in a small number of key ridings.

Under the Paul Martin Liberal Government (2004–06) all the ridings with strong Pakistani and Sri Lankan representation in Toronto and strong Haitian representation in Montreal were held by members of Parliament running for the Liberal Party of Canada. In
Figure 5: Immigrants from Sri Lanka in Toronto ridings as a percentage of select federal riding populations in Toronto, 2001
Source: Statistics Canada.

Toronto, the Liberals were able to hang on to almost all those ridings in the January 2006 election. While they did not generally fare as well in Montreal in ridings with strong Haitian representation, they were able to retain the Montreal riding with the greatest Haitian population.

Based on these observations one may postulate that there appears to exist a relationship between the way ODA is dispersed, the way the DART is deployed, and the way ethnic-minority diasporas congregate in Canada’s electoral ridings. No causal relationship per se follows necessarily from these findings. However, there appears to be a pattern. The pattern is further reinforced that Liberals show considerable resilience in those ridings.

The observation that members of recent ethnic immigrant communities exhibit a propensity for voting Liberal is not new. What is novel in this analysis, however, is the link between ethnic minority diaspora communities, electoral behaviour, and foreign policy. It is difficult to speculate about the direction of causality at work here. Do ethnic minority diasporas vote Liberal because they feel they have more clout over the Liberals' foreign-policy agenda (as opposed to another party's foreign-policy program)? Did the Liberals orchestrate foreign policy to shore up their vote among specific ethnic minority communities? Whatever the case may be, there seems to be a trend.

The trend is not as strong in the larger scheme of things. Figure 8 depicts the way the regional distribution of ODA has evolved in recent years.
While Canada’s commitment to the Americas has remained constant and its pledge to Asia has grown moderately, the amount of aid to Africa and the Middle East almost doubled between fiscal years 1999–2000 and 2003–04. Contrast that with immigration trends in figure 9. At first glance, there is no obvious relationship.

On closer examination, however, as immigration from Asia has increased, so has the Canadian Government’s ODA commitment in that region. Similarly, while ODA spending on Africa seems to have increased markedly, as immigration from the Americas has held fairly constant, so has ODA spending in that region.

For neopluralists, this observation is interesting because it suggests that socioeconomic factors are not the only ones skewing policy. Ethnocultural demographic factors among diaspora communities in Canada also seem to impose a policy constraint. Table 5 shows that the same contention does not hold for Canada’s aforementioned ODA investment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Ethiopia, for their diasporas are far smaller a proportion of Canada’s population than the Haitian and Pakistani diasporas.

Two different dynamics seem to be at work with regard to Canadian ODA priorities. On the one hand, disproportionate amounts of ODA seems to flow to some countries that also receive a lot of USAID
monies. On the other hand, Canada's seems to want to score a high grade on ODA in some countries that also have a relatively strong diaspora in Canada. The claim that ethnocultural pluralism - and its distribution across the country - may have at least some influence on the way ODA is directed is further bolstered by the observation that member states of La Francophonie seem to fare particularly well in the national allocation of Canadian ODA (Canada 2003-04).

In other words, Canada's relationship with the United States is not the only constraint acting on Canadian foreign policy. The analysis in this chapter suggests that, be it ODA or the DART, domestic constraints - notably ethnocultural ones - also seem to matter.

CONCLUSION

We started out by observing a disconnect between Canadian foreign-policy priorities and the apparent preferences of Canadians. We postulated neopluralism as a possible explanation: some groups wield more influence over the policy process than others. If there were an unambiguous national interest on issues such as ODA or peacekeeping, then interest groups may be of less interest in the study of foreign policy. On most global issues, however, there is no clear national interest. In a democracy the national interest is what it is judged to be after debate and discussion (Nye). Those groups with a particular interest in a subject, be it for ethnic or economic reasons, will dominate and shape the debate. The debate, hence the policy, both reflect particular interests. The conventional statist/realist take on Canadian Government decision-making is thus turned on its head? Larger amounts of ODA end up not necessarily with developing states that are of strategic importance to Canada per se but with developing states that are of strategic interest to pivotal electoral constituencies and to the Canada-us relationship.

Neopluralism is particularly concerned about the undue power exerted by particular, notably economic, interests. Indeed, the analysis turned up economic interests as an overriding concern in Canadian foreign policy. That outcome, however, was expected, especially in light of the geostrategic continentalist constraints with which Canada has to contend when exercising its sovereignty.

Yet, the analysis also turned up another set of constraints: it suggests that changing demographic trends may also have some bearing on the government's foreign-policy agenda. Canada's geostrategic location in the world is unlikely to change; Canada's demographic footprint, by contrast, is changing. The symbiotic relationship between growing ethnocultural diversity and Canadian foreign-policy priorities is an emerging structural story, one worth watching. The institutional constraints within which Canadian foreign policy has traditionally operated thus seem to be increasingly mediated by evolving structural constraints.

In short, the rapid sociodemographic changes to which the Canadian population is subject are likely to become an ever more salient intervening variable impinging on the Canada-us. relationship. How likely depends on the electoral expediency - in the guise of "democratic responsiveness" - of Canada's federal political parties and elites. If growing ethnocultural differentiation, diversity, and fragmentation among the Canadian population and growing electoral posturing for "ethnic votes" are any indication, domestic structural considerations in Canadian foreign policy are probably on the rise. How well the cross-border relationship will fare is thus at least partially a function of the concurrent evolution of structural and institutional constraints. If their trajectories diverge, the Canada-us relationship is likely to fare worse than if they converge. And if convergence were to bolster the same policy constraints that economic globalization imposes on national governments, congruent institutional and structural constraints end up reinforcing one another so as to curtail the Canadian Government's flexibility on foreign policy.

NOTES

The authors are indebted to research assistance by Nicolette O'Connor.

1 Doran goes on to write that the United States looks at the world through the prism of its relations with the world. In the first, the US may be larger than it really is; in the second, Canada may seem smaller than it really is.

2 This is not to say this process was actually reflective of Canadians' views. The department's travelling road show was largely hijacked by special interests and the selection bias intrinsic to digital democracy is considerable (e.g., Alexander and Pal). Still, in good Milibandian fashion (see Miliband), the process was, supposedly, not entirely elite-driven; at least it had a facade of popular legitimacy.
These priorities are taken directly from Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (Canada, FAC, 2005).

The four polls are: Pollara, Canadian's Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy, report prepared for The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, April 2004; Innovative Research Group, Visions of Canadian Foreign Policy, report prepared for The Dominion Institute of Canada and the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, Toronto, November 2004; Ipsos-Reid, Canadian Views on Canada's Roll in International Affairs, report prepared for the University of Ottawa, Vancouver 2005; Innovative Research Group, The World in Canada: Demographics and Diversity in Canadian Foreign Policy, report prepared for the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, Toronto, October 2005.

Birkland (22) defines a focusing event as "an event that is sudden, relatively rare, can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of potentially greater future harms, inflicts harms or suggests potential harms that are or could be concentrated on a definable geographical area or community or interest, and that is known to policy makers and the public virtually simultaneously."

Canada's disbursement of ODA has already been shown to have been influenced by its membership in international organizations such as the Commonwealth and La Francophonie (Rioux; Thérien 1989).

For examples of the statist approach to Canadian foreign aid, see Spicer; Triantis; Nossal 1988.

Public Perceptions of Canada-US Relations: Regionalism and Diversity

Evan Potter

One of the perpetual questions in any examination of the Canadian mindset concerns attitudes toward the United States. This is not surprising given the dominant role played by US culture, politics, and economics in daily Canadian life and, therefore, in Canada's self-image. With the blurring of lines demarcating national policy and international policy, a process that has accelerated in post-9/11 North America, US security concerns – at home and abroad – have had increasing implications for Canada's own security postures and economic prosperity.

Calling for a more "sophisticated relationship," the Liberal Government of Paul Martin issued an International Policy Statement in April 2005 advocating a global foreign policy anchored by a closer partnership in North America. It was understood that by continuing to play an active, global role, Canada would, in fact, be reinforcing its bilateral relationship with the United States.

Public attitudes toward the United States are a source of great interest – some would say obsession – north of the forty-ninth parallel. There are good reasons for this. As shown by the national debate on free trade in the 1980s, the Chrétien Government's refusal to participate in the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Martin Government's difficulty in arriving at a position on missile defense in 2005, an understanding of the public mood is essential to making political decisions and calibrating policy positions when Canada-US relations are involved. For this reason, Canadian attitudes toward the United States and, to a lesser extent, US attitudes toward Canada, have been