CHAPTER FOUR

THE ETHNIC DEMOGRAPHY ADVANTAGE
CANADA’S FORCE MULTIPLIER

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The most valuable asset Canada contributed to the recent naval deployment in the Persian Gulf may have been neither material nor technology, but human resources. An ordinary sailor made a unique contribution to the campaign — not because of his training, position, or skill — but because he spoke Farsi, the language of Iran. This unassuming Canadian sailor served as the front man whenever the armada stopped Iranian ships or communicated with Iranian authorities.

Ethnic diversity and multiculturalism are distinguishing characteristics of Canada. Scholars of immigration and multiculturalism often point to a range of instrumental benefits flowing from such policies in a shrinking global community. This chapter hypothesizes that the military stands to benefit from harnessing both trends. It advances three propositions in support of the argument, each of which posits demographics as the independent variable.

The first contention is that greater diversity is good for the military. Ethnic under-representation — or non-representation — is causing Canada to forfeit its potential comparative advantage over virtually any other Western military. Canada has the most diverse pool of potential recruits of almost any liberal democracy. It also maintains comparatively good relations with its ethnic minorities, which should make it easier to recruit them, preserve their language and culture, and employ these in the service of the state.

The second contention is that ethno-cultural diversity within the military serves as a nation-building tool. Building trust, community, and a sense of belonging co-opts members of diasporas into the Canadian state. As members of the Canadian Forces, they serve Canada’s national interests, thus
integrating immigrants into the state and legitimizing national interests in the
eyes of the group represented.

The third contention is that greater ethno-cultural diversity in the military
is good for Canadian sovereignty. If integrated into the CF, Canada’s
immigrant population will bolster Canada’s relations with the United States
and other NATO allies by making Canada the force of choice in a coalition.
The Canadian Forces’ position as the foremost peacekeeping, peace-making,
and peacebuilding force would thus be reasserted.

Canada’s comparatively good relations with the country’s resident ethnic
diasporas represents a unique human resource. It can be leveraged to contribute
to public information, civil affairs and psychological operations, command and
control warfare, and information operations. In effect, Canada’s ethno-demographic
advantage facilitates the use of civil affairs and psychological operations as a
Canadian force multiplier in support of today’s asymmetrical operations.

Civil affairs units have emerged as some of the busiest troops in the US
military. Their activities establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations
among military forces, civil authorities, and the civilian population in support
of military operations. Their expertise in bridging military and civil affairs
has been in demand in virtually every recent military operation: Somalia, Haiti,
Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Since they lead civil reconstruction
efforts, demand for their capabilities is bound to remain high for both security
and humanitarian reasons.

Psychological operations are used to convey selected information to foreign
audiences to induce or reinforce attitudes and behaviors favorable to the
originator’s objectives. Like civil affairs units, psychological operations
units are similarly sought after for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.
Their public-diplomacy and public-safety activities have been integral parts
of US operations in Somalia, Haiti, Kurdistan, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and
Iraq. They have extensive language and cultural training and experience.

In JTF 2, Canada currently possesses a capability for direct-action special
operations with its own special-reconnaissance and counter-terrorism
capabilities. Yet, direct action is the special capability least in need of cultural
affinity because it is the least likely to carry out culturally dependent missions.
JTF 2 garners great respect for its people, equipment, and training and
for its ability to carry out missions. A force, however, is only as effective as
its ability to deploy. This is where JTF 2 falls short. Special operations “lift”
comes in the form of two strategic assets: maritime and air. The CF possesses
neither capability in the forms used by US SOF (a strategic submarine fleet
and long-range cargo aircraft like the C17). Canada thus maintains a small,
effective, and costly unit whose instrumental value is diminished severely by
its inability to conduct strategic moves.

Future theatres of deployment for a direct-action counter-terrorist unit
will probably be concentrated in Asia, including the Middle East, and Africa,
particularly in countries with Muslim majorities or substantial Muslim
minorities. A cursory survey of groups declared illegal by the Canadian
government since September 11 pursuant to Part II.1 of the Criminal Code
substantiates this claim. Of the groups that have since been banned (see Appendix
for the complete list), sixteen are associated with the Middle East (47%
percent), eleven are based in Asia (32 percent), two in North Africa (6 per-
cent), one in the rest of Africa (3 percent), three in South America (9 percent),
and one in Europe. Although fairly short, the list is significant because it
represents Canadian interests; these groups were banned because their activities
are believed to conflict with Canada’s national interest. It follows that
Canada might participate in international action directed against some of these
groups in the future Canada’s contribution to the campaign in Afghanistan to
oust the Taliban regime (in league with al-Qaeda) illustrates the point. In other
words, Asien, particularly the Middle East, is by far the most probable theatre
of operations for special operations.

Yet, the counties capable of mounting effective special operations in
this theatre are constrained by phenotype, culture, and language. Their
phenotypic markers, as well as their unfamiliarity with the language and
customs and the incoherence of their subversive networks of internal support for
inserted troops, present formidable obstacles to effective operations. This
phenotypic, cultural, and linguistic disjuncture impedes on their mobility,
effectiveness, and durability. They cannot blend into the local population, which
makes it difficult for them to hide, especially for extended periods of time.
They can communicate with locals on only a very limited basis, making it difficult
to build trust or collect intelligence through conversations. Even the need to
procure supplies from outside the area further limits the scope of a mission.

DEMOGRAPHY AND DIVERSITY

Canada is well positioned to find people familiar with the indigenous popula-
tion of many regions in conflict. Where knowledge of language and culture
confers advantage, the diaspora communities of other countries, notwithstanding,
Canada’s particularly well positioned demographically within the G8.
But in addition to meeting the socio-demographic precondition, Canada’s state
apparatus has earned the trust of its immigrant and refugee communities.
Without trust in the state, members of diasporas are unlikely to be induced to join
the military in any capacity.

Only three liberal democracies have a migrant stock larger than Canada’s:
the United States (with almost 35 million), Germany (7.3 million), and
France (6.3 million). Canada’s migrant stock stands at 5.8 million. About
three percent of the world’s population, some 175 million people, currently
reside outside their country of birth. The proportion of Canada’s foreign-born
population, however, is more than five times that: 18.9 percent. Among
large and mid-sized liberal democracies, only Australia (at about 24 percent)
has a greater proportion of immigrants among its population. The U.S., France,
Germany, the U.K., and Italy fall between 12 to about 3 percent. In so far as
the total number of migrants as well as their proportion of the population is concerned, Canada is favourably situated.

The rate at which new immigrants are arriving, added to the existing stock of immigrants, is also a factor in demographic diversity. Sixty percent of the world’s migrants reside in industrialized countries, 56 million in Europe and 41 million in North America. Almost one person in ten living in more developed regions is a migrant. Between 1995 and 2000, the world’s more developed regions gained over 12 million migrants. For the year 2002 alone, the figure stood at 2.3 million. Over half of the total was absorbed by North America. While the U.S. accounts for 1.25 million of them, Canada still had a higher annual average rate of net migration per thousand. Among liberal democracies, Canada’s rate of net migration is second only to Australia’s. Economic “push-pull” theories of migration suggest that migrants end up where they can maximize their economic benefit. The socio-geographical evidence, however, suggests otherwise. Migrants settle where they already have family or ethnic kin – with both variables usually coinciding. This accounts for differentials in immigrant stock among countries. For example, the top ten countries of origin for foreign-born Canadians in the 2001 census were England, France, Scotland, Ireland, Germany, Italy, China, Ukraine, Netherlands, and Poland. For the United States in the 2000 census, they were Mexico, China, Philippines, India, Cuba, Vietnam, El Salvador, Korea, the Dominican Republic, and Canada. The differences reflect historic settlement patterns and networks of immigrant communities, which facilitate subsequent settlement.

In light of the differential in total population between the two countries, Canada turns out to have a far greater proportion of immigrants from India, the Philippines, and Vietnam, for instance, than the United States, where the disproportionately large number of Hispanics and African-Americans dwarfs other ethnic groups. In Canada, by contrast, no single ethnic group of non-Caucasian origin clearly outweighs all others. Pakistan and Iran have emerged as important sources of immigration to Canada (in third and fifth place). By contrast, in 1961, Pakistani and Iranian immigration (as a proportion of immigrants received) ranked 23rd and 25th in the United States. Currently, about 1.5 million immigrants from the Middle East live in the United States, less than half of one percent of America’s total population. According to the 1996 census, the figure for Canada stands at 210,000, or almost one percent. The proportion of Middle-Eastern immigrants is thus marginally higher in Canada than it is in the U.S.

Yet, Canada’s comparative advantage is bolstered by numbers that imply Middle-Eastern immigrants prefer Canada to the United States – with the notable exception of Jewish Israelis. About 700,000 Jewish-Israeli expatriates (most with Israeli-US dual citizenship) reside in the United States. This suggests that the figures for the Middle-Eastern population residing in the U.S. may be skewed. On the one hand, then, the disaggregated numbers indicate that Arabs make up a greater proportion of Canada’s foreign-born population.

On the other hand, both that proportion and the discrepancy between the U.S. and Canada are likely to rise in the wake of September 11. It follows that the pool of potential special-operations links with, say, the Arab community in Canada is relatively more plentiful than the potential pool of Arab recruits for US special operations, although the total number of potential Arab recruits in the U.S. is certainly larger. Whether the Canadian Forces can harness this latent advantage hinges on the community’s internal dynamics and its relationship with the Canadian state.

Irrespective of the positive correlations between multiculturalism and immigration, government policy towards immigrants represents the other side of Canada’s comparative advantage. Canada’s multiculturalism policy has created a wide range of ethnic organizations, including youth groups, which have been co-opted into the Canadian state and whose mandates are congruent with Canada’s national interests. Nevertheless, these organizations enjoy legitimacy within their own communities. As a consequence, the Canadian state enjoys better relations with communities of recent immigrants than do many other liberal democracies. Survey results confirm the positive attitude Canadians have towards interethnic relations.

**POLITICAL DEMOGRAPHY OF ETHNIC-DIAPOSA LINKAGES**

Political and ethnic dynamics make Canada a fruitful ground for strategic linkages with select ethnic diasporas. What is more, data available to us through census results and Statistics Canada actually facilitate this strategy. The census tracks immigrants not only by ethnic group and province but also by division. Like most immigrants to Canada, Iranian immigrants, for instance, tend to settle in Ontario and British Columbia. The 2001 census shows about 42,000 immigrants from Iran in Ontario, about 18,000 in B.C., and about 8,000 in Quebec. The figures for the remaining provinces are negligible. This pattern reflects the kin networks already in place.

Census data allow us to go further to identify significant regions. In Ontario, for example, Iranians choose to settle predominantly in Toronto and York region over any other census division. It is relatively easy to determine how many immigrants from a selected place of birth have settled in particular census divisions. Concentration in large cities facilitates strategic recruitment of Canada’s ethnic diasporas.

**OPERATIONALIZING CANADA’S DEMOGRAPHIC ADVANTAGE**

Canada’s demographic and political advantage notwithstanding, the argument as presented so far merits caution. An immediate concern is the historic
difficulty in recruiting minorities. But that is precisely why it makes sense for the CF's special operations to develop civil-affairs and psychological-operations capabilities. While immigrants may be reluctant to join traditional military units, they might be more receptive if recruited specifically for their language and area expertise. There would be comfort for some in knowing that future dealings with their homeland or its neighbours would be undertaken with the advantage of a Canadian uniform and government passport. More problematic for my argument are concerns about trust and sociological research into the ways by which immigrants integrate into a host population.

Some critics argue that targeting a specific pool of potential recruits may reduce the quality of acceptable recruits. Would federally equalized recruitment patterns - regional origin and first official language have long been variables in CF recruitment - not have the same effect? Targeted recruitment helps to ensure the social balance dictated by policy, including germane regional and linguistic representation. This balance makes it easier to maintain public support for operations and provides local knowledge in the case of aid to civil authorities, as in the 1997 ice storm or the 1999 Winnipeg flood. In these operations, and in the internal security operations at Oka, Akwesasne, and Kanesatake in 1990, both official languages were important. Targeting other language groups for international operations can have the same positive impact, increasing both representation and operational effectiveness.

Recruits for physically demanding direct-action forces like parachute units or counter-terrorist forces should be drawn from the widest possible pool because the success rate is quite low. It would be inappropriate to search for these qualities in ethnically or linguistically defined groups. Civil affairs and psychological operations, on the other hand, suggest different types of training and different qualities. Physical fitness and reflexes are less important here than maturity, intellect, patience, and linguistic and cultural knowledge.

Concerns with recruitment may also reflect a myopic attitude towards the role that diasporas can play. Members of immigrant communities in Canada need not be recruited into special operations units or even into the CF in order to play an instrumental role. It may be sufficient to identify individuals among specific immigrant groups with knowledge or skills that may prove useful in future missions. For example, recent immigrants may have local knowledge of urban geography around a target for hostage rescue or direct action. Being able to identify these individuals and gain their cooperation does not necessitate them being recruited, selected, and trained.

Trust and confidence are built over time and are affected by experience. Migrants often leave their countries of origin because of conflict with organs of the state, particularly the police and the military. In other words, they migrate because they have lost confidence in their own states. It may take them some time to regain confidence, to realize that the state is not intrinsically to be feared but rather that the Canadian state, and the values it embodies and defends, warrants their support and collaboration. Building confidence within immigrant communities, followed by active recruitment, could develop a valuable human resource.

Canada would be well served by a pool of trusted members among strategic diasporas. A teacher, for instance, might be called in at short notice to provide language or cultural-sensitivity courses to troops prior to deployment. The CF could draw on the expertise of the Canadian Foreign Service Institute (CFSI), which offers instruction in 42 languages. More importantly, the CFSI's Centre for Intercultural Learning (CIL) specializes in making the country's diplomatic corps proficient in the skills and knowledge required to live, work, and negotiate in a foreign setting. If special forces are to be "global diplomats", this is the sort of expertise that must be added to their skill set. Organizations such as the CFSI and CIL are well positioned to teach soldiers and police as well as diplomats.

A translation service run by a native speaker may serve as a stand-by source for timely translation of open-source documentation before, during, or after a mission. Through Internet and satellite connections, some translators might even work in Toronto or Vancouver, supporting civil affairs or other special operations in distant theatres. Reliable translators for potential theatres of operation may be few, and in a crisis, the translation capacities in CSIS or the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) are likely to be stretched or overwhelmed. When units cannot overcome language barriers, they cannot understand their environment, gather intelligence, or even protect themselves effectively. Timely communication can be vital to mission success. Be it a military unit, intelligence service, development agency, or international policing, any agency operating in the global village needs language services and would benefit from a network of reliable translators who can be available on short notice.

The Toronto Police Service, for instance, has translators for 140 languages, on standby around the clock every day of the year. They can be brought into the field with community liaison officers or regular constables or patched into a three-way call between a 911 operator and a caller. By incorporating recent immigrant populations, the Toronto Police can interact with them and serve them effectively.

CANADEM provides another model for incorporating multicultural expertise. Funded by the Department of Foreign Affairs, it maintains a national roster of more than five thousand Canadian civilians with a broad range of knowledge and skills, including human rights monitoring, conduct of elections, democratization, administration and logistics, security, and post-conflict reconstruction. CANPOL is an affiliated agency that maintains a roster of policing expertise for international deployment. Both of these government-sponsored non-governmental organizations serve as vehicles for rapid, nationally directed response to international crises. They allow Canada to provide appropriately qualified people to international missions sponsored by bodies such as the UN. They can also be tapped by other non-governmental organizations, CANADEM, or another agency modelled on it, could mobilize and catalogue immigrant expertise to serve the national interest.
Immigrants from a potential theatre may be a source of vital intelligence through contacts they still have in their places of origin. They may also have topographical and geostrategic insights. Despite all the cartographical information and intelligence available, arguably there is no better source of guidance than someone with intimate, first-hand knowledge of the area, either accompanying the troops or available for consultation through radio contact. Since those who have left a conflict zone most recently may be the least forthcoming, Citizenship and Immigration Canada might offer incentives to individuals with urgently needed knowledge or skills.22

Through their contacts, immigrants may also be able to enhance the success of a mission in other ways. Trusted family members abroad might be recruited to harbour operatives, to assist in communications, or to supply food or information. M16's Special Operations Executive pioneered such tactics during the Second World War.23 Friendly locals can extend strategic reach beyond the limits of military logistics, increase the longevity of missions, and provide for backup in case other arrangements fail. This makes it possible for special operations to be conducted prior to any armed intervention, or even in its absence. Detailed local knowledge and friendly forces in location may pay significant dividends, for development and diplomacy no less than for invasions such as those of the Second World War. Family ties to immigrants back in Canada will help to increase the reliability of such help.

Reliability will always be a concern in working with immigrant communities. As Canada acts in concert with allies, and as special operations affect highly classified intelligence, technology, or sensitive national interests, both Canadian and allied decision-makers might question the wisdom of involving recent immigrant communities. The U.S., for example, has a high proportion of blacks and Hispanics and a representative proportion of various other ethnic groups, but minorities are vastly under-represented in Special Operations Forces, particularly in the officer ranks.24 Americans view minority members of their own forces as "American", but Canadians recruited from ethnic minorities may not necessarily be viewed as such.25 Two Muslim members of the US forces stationed at Guantanamo Bay, for example, have been charged with various trust- and loyalty-related offences. Ethnics in the military invariably raise the question of loyalty and trust.

For purposes of recruitment, the relationship between identity (be it ascriptive or descriptive) and culture - the patterns of behaviour associated with a particular group - is important. It might be posited that immigrants from cultures that put a premium on familial, local, and tribal relationships would prove difficult to recruit, if only because recruitment would break that nuclear bond. In a country as big as Canada, military moves are almost inevitable. Ethnic recruits might be separated from their families for training, garrisoned far away from their kin, deployed overseas for extended periods, and so forth. Research suggests that if familial, local, and tribal attributes are related to culture rather than identity, they will dissipate fairly rapidly upon separation.

Under Canada's "mosaic" model, immigrants are thought to retain a strong sense of ethnic identity, but this is not to be confused with the retention of elements of the culture of origin. A strong identity does not necessarily mean immigrants are more conversant in their original language, well-versed in their original religion, more likely to marry within the group, or more likely to want to live within an ethnic neighbourhood. On the contrary, many of those criteria immigrants to Canada quickly relinquish links with their ancestral culture.26 It follows that the relationship between identity and culture is probably inverse rather than direct.

A weak sense of culture but a strong sense of identity may be the prerequisite combination to recruit individuals from more "traditional" cultures in the first place. A strong sense of ethnic identity, however, may cause problems when ethnic recruits are mixed.27 Can we expect to send a Canadian unit made up of personnel from different ethnic groups to a region where those same groups are in conflict? Members of all groups may have better knowledge of the geography and cultures, but they may sympathize with one faction or the other.28 The experience with recruiting and employing mixed ethnic teams is limited.29

Targeted recruitment of ethnic minorities is fraught with contradictions. To be useful, immigrants have to have maintained ties with their countries of origin and retained a good deal of the kin culture. But to serve Canada, they have to place Canadian interests ahead of the interests of their former homeland or kin group. To this end, immigrants need to be supportive of Canada's political culture. In cases where the Canadian interest coincides with the interest of the country (or group) Canada is trying to help, any tension between them is not a problem. But the more closely ethnic recruits identify with the country or people where they are deployed, the less they will be able to serve Canadian interests when there is a clash with those of the kin community or state. Such is the historic dilemma of ethnic armies.30

Despite residual attachments to their homelands, involvement of immigrants in homeland affairs is often instrumental in adaptation to the norms of their new country of residence.31 Multiculturalism policies support this adaptation by nurturing distinct norms within countries and across international boundaries. Multiculturalism as a principle of government relations with diasporas, therefore, stands to serve Canada's goals with respect to foreign policy and nation-building.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS

The ethnic composition of Canada's population pyramid is changing rapidly. As the population ages, the proportion of Caucasians diminishes. In 2001, the proportion of visible minorities in Canada (not counting 1.4 million aboriginals) stood at 13.4 percent, a 43 percent increase since 1991 (Table 4-1). Increases were greatest in British Columbia (52 percent), followed by Ontario (47 percent).
TABLE 4-1

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<td>0.9</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
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Source: Statistics Canada

Current recruiting patterns present a problem. The recruitment-age cohort (15-29) is shrinking along with the pool of traditional Caucasian recruits. But the pool of young ethnic recruits is growing because immigrants tend to have more children than the Canadian average. In fact, the total fertility rate is inversely proportional to the amount of time spent in Canada: the longer immigrants remain in Canada, the closer their fertility rate approximates the national average. If we were to plot effort required to recruit on a vertical axis and useful knowledge of a foreign homeland on a horizontal axis, the result would probably be a curve like a normal distribution. The horizontal axis would also correspond to time spent in Canada. At the left side of the curve, we would find recent immigrants who have not yet adopted Canadian ways or allegiance to the Canadian state. Their experiences may lead to apprehension about any connection with state security apparatus, and they may deter their children from joining. At the right side of the curve, we would find assimilated Canadians with low fertility rates, requiring relatively higher effort to recruit. At the high centre of the curve, we find second- and third-generation immigrants whom we might still expect to have useful knowledge of or contacts in a foreign homeland.

The proportion of visible minorities in the population is growing while the proportion of Caucasians is waning. By 2011, 39 percent of Canada's population is projected to identify as non-anglophone, non-francophone, and non-Canadian. A force in which ethnic recruits are under-represented is not optimizing its labour pool. I have made the argument above that greater diaspora involvement in special operations enhances capacity in a global community by harnessing Canada's demographic edge. This is complemented by the utilitarian argument that recruiting amongst the largest pool of available youth will optimize return on recruiting investment.

Is the CF constraining its potential through its recruiting strategy? At 54,000, the CF falls short of its authorized troop strength of 60,000. Using the American figure of two percent suggests about 1,200 troops engaged in special operations — more if reserve civil affairs units are included. This is all the more problematic, given the difficulties in keeping elite units up to strength. Delta Force in the U.S., for example, has never exceeded 82 percent of its authorized strength. To optimize special operations recruitment, Canadian Forces must first optimize recruitment, and greater diversity is the key to achieving this end. Research into structural and perceived barriers responsible for low rates of ethnic-minority representation among US special operations may offer some helpful insights into the Canadian ethnic-recruitment predicament. This research shows that quality of opportunity for minorities in special operations can be improved.

Greater integration of immigrant communities (in national institutions generally and in the Canadian Forces and special operations in particular) will enhance social cohesion in Canada. It can enhance the allegiance of future immigrants to the Canadian state by demonstrating mutual benefits from commitment and by providing role models and focal points for identity. This enhances the sort of social cohesion that in turn encourages immigrants to engage in national institutions, making further recruitment easier. Drawing forces more proportionately from Canadian society is a nation-building strategy that will enhance Canada's ability to conduct special operations in a global community.

Civil affairs and psychological operations troops, as special units of the Canadian Forces, have a special role to play in Canadian nation-building and overseas operations. Canadian regular units have made a name for themselves through aggressive competence in combat operations and conventional skill at arms. But their reputation goes further. In decades of peacekeeping operations in Cyprus, the Middle East, Asia, the Americas, and the Balkans, tens of thousands of Canadian soldiers, sailors, and airmen and women have helped to build relationships with communities in conflict. These relationships have helped to reduce the likelihood that Canadian troops will be targeted. Canadian political and military culture makes much of this “nice guy” image, relying as much on communication as on combat skills. Civil-affairs campaigns embody the values and practices of cooperation, relationship-building, and behavioural change that are often associated with successful Canadian missions. While American psychological operations are classed as a form of “offensive fire”, Canada established Military Information Support Teams (MIST) in Haiti to perform the psychological-operations function in a transparent and non-offensive way. Civil affairs and psychological operations, as
practised by Canada, are more likely to be embraced by Canadians than direct action because they coincide with Canadian values and practices. This includes the values and practices that have proven integral to Canada's longstanding reputation as an immigrant country. Those same values should facilitate recruitment of immigrants for this sort of special operation.

Demaedeker reached unprecedented levels for civil affairs and psychological operations troops. Both capabilities are central to the Brahimi Report of the future UN peacekeeping. Although it identified multi-dimensional cohesion as the core of future UN contributions to peacekeeping, this translates into a focus on local peacekeeping with a view to providing a framework for security and stability. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan exemplify how this might be achieved in practice. As originally fielded by the U.S. in 2003, these teams consisted of 60 to 90 soldiers formed around a 12-man Special Forces "A" team, complemented by civil affairs and psychological operations capabilities. Developing this kind of special operations capability puts Canada in line with UN priorities and at the forefront of international stability missions.

Civil affairs and psychological operations capabilities are an optimal force multiplier for the Canadian Forces. They may thus serve to integrate Canada's continentalist and internationalist imperatives. Since Suez, Canada has engaged in missions that have been difficult for the Americans to take on due to domestic or international pressures. Canada's peacekeeping in the Congo and peace observation in Kashmir served Cold War objectives; Canada's force in Cyprus helped keep NATO together. More recently, Canada's leadership in Kabul freed up American forces for other missions. The Canadian Navy is one of only two in the world whose ships are fully interoperable with the US Navy, and the U.K. is the only other country whose air force shares the Common Targeting System with Canada and the U.S. Notwithstanding its small size, Canada has a history of making key contributions to American foreign and military policy.

The uncertain future security environments described in Chapter One suggest many opportunities for conflict within states and across international boundaries in a global community. A culturally and linguistically adept military with a substantial diaspora representation is Canada's most promising means of making itself an indispensable partner in any coalition. This will buttress our bilateral relationship with the U.S. and reinforce our capacity to make a unique contribution to multilateral UN efforts. This demands that Canada rethink special operations capabilities.

The best way to turn Canada's demographic advantage into operational capability is to accelerate the development of reserve units with civil affairs and psychological operations capabilities. The Canadian Forces can further enhance the effectiveness of these units by using census data to locate them in areas of high immigrant concentration and by concentrating recruiting efforts on potentially useful immigrant groups. The Governor General's Horseguards

in the Greater Toronto Area, Canada's most multi-ethnic reserve unit, is exemplary in this regard. Establishing reserve companies for special operations in Montreal for the francophone, in Toronto for Europe, the Caribbean and Latin America, and in Toronto and Vancouver for Asia-Pacific might be a good start. The units could be seeded with regular and reserve personnel who have already honed their skills in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

American Special Operations Forces rely heavily on reserves. Of the 46,000 special operations personnel, only 29,000 are on active duty. Sixty percent of America's psychological operations personnel and 97 percent of its civil affairs personnel are in the Army Reserves. The Army will add new civil affairs and psychological operations reserve companies by 2005. Reserves are a cost-effective way to build and maintain special capabilities for use in contingencies. Their appeal results from their deployment on many kinds of operations without large accompanying forces. Because they are not inherently offensive, as direct action forces are, they can be used in a variety of different circumstances to shape the strategic environment, whether or not large coalitions or NATO forces are deployed.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

On the one hand, Canada's military has long been pivotal in its relations with the U.S. On the other hand, that makes its role controversial. Ideally, Canada's comparative advantages should be harnessed in a fiscally responsible and realistic way. I have argued that developing a role for immigrants in special operations is one way forward. Language, culture, phenotype, and local knowledge will be vital in future operations in the global community. Special operations will need to take advantage of networks, local intelligence, human contacts, and social and cultural understanding. Integrating minorities stands to strengthen Canada and its national security and to balance Canada's continental and international imperatives.

Some important recommendations follow from this study of Canada's ethnographic edge. Canada should recruit immigrant communities for special operations such as civil affairs and psychological operations. Recruitment should focus on cities such as Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal. More research is needed on the processes by which immigrants are effectively recruited and integrated in military service, and on the factors that deter or enhance recruitment and international service. This knowledge may facilitate recommendations for change in institutional culture or recruiting practices. Canada's ethnographic advantage stands out as the Canadian Forces' ultimate multiplier.
NOTES

1. This research was supported financially by the Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations branch of Canada’s Department of National Defence and by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The author gratefully acknowledges research assistance provided by Nicolette O’Connor and Natasha Kanerva and is indebted to Randy Richert, Casey Haskins, Terry Loveridge, Joel Sokolsky, and Will Kynelicka for comments and feedback.

2. By peacemaking, the UN and NATO understand diplomatic activity with a very low level of military involvement; by peacemaking they understand observers and inter-positional forces in a mutually agreed peace; peace enforcement refers to a policy of creating a peace without prior agreement of the parties to the conflict, bringing armed force to bear, if necessary; peacekeeping refers to post-combat operations and is usually associated with the three-block war paradigm where, within a radius of three blocks, a force is providing aid, interacting with local populations, and engaging an armed militia.


5. Not factored into the analysis is these organizations’ fundraising efforts pervasive throughout liberal democracies. Furthermore, al-Qaeda is double-counted as Asia and as Middle East.


7. Ibid.


16. Statistics Canada’s resource tool, E-Stat, was used to track down the data. Through any licensed administrator, such as a registered university or public library, it is possible to identify variables and generate data using the figures documented in Statistics Canada’s CANSIM matrices and tables. The data presented for the purposes of this paper are also available in the Statistics Canada’s publication, Profile of Citizenship, Immigration, Birthplace, Generation Status, Ethnic Origin, Visible Minorities and Aboriginal Peoples, for Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Divisions and Census Subdivisions, 2001 Census, Cat. No. 95F0049XCEP0100E. Note that in addition to the category “Total immigrants by selected places of birth”, another variable measures “Total recent immigrants by selected places of birth - 20 percent Sample Data”. Statistics Canada refers to these persons who immigrated to Canada between 1996 and Census Day, 15 May 2001, as “Recent immigrants.”

17. Eighty-five percent of immigrants live in the country’s largest 25 urban regions, compared to only 57 percent of Canadian-born citizens. Recent immigrants are most likely to settle in Canada’s largest cities. Toronto’s immigrant population exceeds 42 percent and Vancouver’s 35 percent, followed by Hamilton (24 percent) and Kitchener (22 percent), both within close proximity of Toronto. Nearly threequarters of recent immigrants settled in Toronto, Vancouver, or Montreal, although these cities house only a quarter of the country’s population. Recent immigrants are more than twice as likely to live in Toronto than in Vancouver and more than thrice as likely to live in Toronto or Montreal. As a result, Ontario has by far the largest proportion of immigrants (55 percent), followed by British Columbia (18 percent) and Québec (13 percent).


19. See Table 1-1, Quality-Quantity Trade-off.


22. In 1941, the US Navy was concerned about sabotage by the large Italian-American population in New York. It arranged for the release


27. Simons, “Evolution of the SOF Soldier”.


### APPENDIX

**List for the purposes of Part II.1 of the Criminal Code**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Location/Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)</strong></td>
<td>Middle East – carried out attacks internationally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)</strong></td>
<td>Iran - smallest and most radical Islamic separatist groups fighting to establish an Iranian style Islamic state in Mindanao (Philippines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al Jihad (AJ or Egyptian Islamic Jihad)</strong></td>
<td>Egypt – wants to replace Egyptian government with an Islamic government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Involved in the Sadat assassination and US embassy bombings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Linked with al-Qaeda and bin Laden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al-Qaeda</strong></td>
<td>International – central component of a network of Sunni Islamic extremist groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Associated with bin Laden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade</strong></td>
<td>Israel – armed faction of Islamic Nationalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al-Gama'a al-islamiyya (AGAI or Islamic Group IG)</strong></td>
<td>Egypt – armed religious extremists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objective: overthrow government to establish Islamic rule; focuses on killing Americans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Links with bin Laden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al-Ittihad Al-Islam (AIAB)</strong></td>
<td>Somalia and Ethiopia – internationally established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objective: create a greater Somali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ansar al-Islam (AI)</strong></td>
<td>Iraq-Kurdish Sunni organization, Part of the al-Qaeda network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ashat Al-Ansar (The League of Partisans and many other names)</strong></td>
<td>Lebanon – Sunni extremist organization composed of Palestinians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objective: establishment of Islamic Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aura Shi'arwa</strong></td>
<td>Japan – sarin gas in Tokyo subway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUD or United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia)</strong></td>
<td>Colombia – right-wing umbrella terrorist organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Closely linked to drug cartels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Babar Khalsa</strong></td>
<td>India – Sikh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objective: form fundamentalist Sikh state called Khalistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Babar Khalsa International (BKI)</strong></td>
<td>India – Sikh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objective: form fundamentalist Sikh state called Khalistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Army or ELN)</strong></td>
<td>Colombia – second-largest left-wing after FARC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opposes foreign involvement in Colombia's oil</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Euskadi Ta Asakatasuna (ETA)</strong></td>
<td>Basque – called most dangerous terrorist organization in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objective: form a Basque state based on Marxist principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)</strong></td>
<td>Colombia – best-equipped Marxist insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Closely linked to drug squads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA)</strong></td>
<td>Based in Algeria – anti-secularist and anti-Western Sunni Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Affiliated with bin Laden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hamas</strong></td>
<td>Israel – Sunni Muslim terrorist organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objective: kill Jews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM)</strong></td>
<td>Pakistan-based radical Kashmiri Islamist organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objective: liberate Kashmir from India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Calls for a jihad against India and the U.S.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hezbollah</strong></td>
<td>Lebanon – Islamic terrorist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objective: remove all western influence from Lebanon, liberate Palestinian territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)</strong></td>
<td>U.K./India – centres in Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objective: establish Khalistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Islamic Army of Acre</strong></td>
<td>Yemen – radical Islamic organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objective: overthrow Yemeni government in favour of Islamic government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ties with al-Qaeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)</strong></td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objective: overthrow government of Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)</strong></td>
<td>Pakistan – radical Islamic organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objective: Liberates Jammu and Kashmir from India and integrate them into Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI)</strong></td>
<td>Southeast Asia – Islamist terrorist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objective: unify Muslims in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Southern Philippines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

... continued
### APPENDIX (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Location/Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)                     | Turkey/Iraq – based on Marxist-Leninist ideology  
Objective: create a Kurdish state in southeast Turkey and northern Iraq |                                                                                                                                                      |
| Lashkar-e-Jhangvi                                 | Pakistan – Sunni Islamic organization  
Objective: create a Sunni Muslim state |                                                                                                                                                      |
| Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LcT)                           | Pakistan/Kashmir/Jammu – radical Islamist organization |                                                                                                                                                      |
| Palestine Liberation Front (PFL)                 | Europe/Israel/Lebanon – faction of the PLO |                                                                                                                                                      |
| Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)                    | Israel (West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon and Syria)  
Objective: Destruction of Israel |                                                                                                                                                      |
| Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC) | Israel – secular Palestinian group guided by Marxist doctrine  
Objective: Destroy Israel |                                                                                                                                                      |
| Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) | Israel – secular Palestinian group guided by Marxist doctrine |                                                                                                                                                      |
| Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)         | Algeria – radical Sunni Muslim group seeking to establish an Islamic government in Algeria  
Affiliated with or funded by bin Laden |                                                                                                                                                      |
| Sendero Luminoso (SL)                             | Peru – Bombed Canadian Embassy  
Objective: establish communist peasant revolutionary regime to rid the country of foreign influences |                                                                                                                                                      |
| Vanguards of Conquest (VOC)                       | Egypt – radical armed wing of the AJ  
Has released assassination lists |                                                                                                                                                      |